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Political Stare Decisis
Oren Tamir*

Abstract
The doctrine of stare decisis famously instructs judges to respect past decisions even if they
believe these decisions are wrong. Many believe stare decisis serves venerable values and bemoan
its apparent demise in various apex courts around the world. But can something like stare decisis
appear in politics too? In other words, can we expect public officials, much like we expect judges,
to also adhere to past decisions even if they think these decisions are wrong? Or when they face
temptations to ignore the past?
If we rely on our normal intuitions about politics, or observe its current state around the
world, the answer seems to be “no.” And while previous scholarship presents a more qualified
view, this literature is greatly incomplete. It focuses on a limited set of domestic and international
institutions that primarily resemble judicial ones. Alternatively, this scholarship is preoccupied
with the normative or interpretive question of how domestic and international courts should
incorporate what looks like a political analogy to stare decisis into legal doctrine. As a result, we
are left uncertain about how broad the phenomenon of constraint by the past in politics really is.
We are also left unsure about where the phenomenon is likely to appear, how exactly it operates,
and what we might be able to do to achieve more (or less) of this type of constraint. In a world
where so much of what seems wrong in domestic and global politics appears connected to the rushed
erosion of the past, or its increased stickiness, this omission is significant.
This Article fills this gap by offering a comprehensive explanatory and functional theory
of the role of the past as a constraint in domestic and global politics, or, in short, a theory of
political stare decisis. Given the stakes of the past in politics today, the Article suggests what
public officials and institutional designers in domestic and international politics might be able to
do to deliberately “tinker” with political stare decisis. For example, how officials can establish
entirely new political precedents that will constrain in the future, how they might strengthen
*
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existing political precedents that they like (or weaken political precedents they dislike), and what
solutions are generally available to make political stare decisis more robust.
The Article concludes with a more jurisprudential point. While much in the discussion
demonstrates that political stare decisis and the more familiar institution of judicial stare decisis
substantially diverge, the Article claims that these differences may be much less meaningful than
meets the eye. Instead of completely divergent practices, judicial stare decisis may ultimately be
nothing more than one species of political stare decisis. The Article argues that acknowledging
this fact significantly improves our understanding of judicial stare decisis. Among other things, it
shows us when judicial stare decisis is “for suckers” and when it is not; it flags new ways to
strengthen judicial stare decisis in jurisdictions where it seems to have dramatically weakened;
and it illuminates how those who work to achieve their goals through domestic and international
courts and their precedents should appropriately (and effectively) approach this task.
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I. I NTRODU C TIO N
Stare decisis is a well-known doctrine commonly employed by courts
working in the common law tradition, including the U.S., the U.K., Canada, and
Australia.1 It instructs judges to regularly respect past decisions—to “stand by
things decided”2—even if those decisions appear to them wrong today.3 And it is
meant to serve a variety of values, including stability,4 epistemic humility,5 and
even integrity.6
The law in general and the judicial process in particular are sites wherein
arguments relying on the logic of stare decisis are undoubtedly common. And it
may very well be that this feature of legal decision-making is in large part what
makes the law distinctive—why, in other words, “thinking like a lawyer”7 is
different from thinking like any other kind of professional.8 Perhaps for this
reason as well it is not surprising that even in systems that expressly reject the
doctrine of stare decisis, including in civil law jurisdictions or at the international
level, judges seem to have tacitly adopted it nonetheless.9
1

2

3

4
5

6

7

8
9

See Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliviera & Nuno Garoupa, Stare Decisis and Certiorari Arrive
to Brazil: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, 26 EMORY INT’L. L.J. 555, 572–79 (2012)
(discussing the evolution of stare decisis in the U.S., the U.K. Canada, and Australia, among other
systems).
This is the usual translation of the Latin term stare decisis. The full Latin expression is “stare decisis
et non quieta movere.” See Stare Decisis et non Quieta Movere, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (“[r]especting stare decisis
means sticking to some wrong decisions”). See generally Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV.
571 (1987); Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Henry P.
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988).
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 879–81 (2014).
See Deborah Hellman, An Epistemic Defense of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 66 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013).
See Frederick Schauer, On Treating Unlike Cases Alike, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 437 (2018). For an
extended treatment of this claim, see RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT (2017).
FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
(2009).
See Alexander, supra note 3, at 3.
For judges at the international level, see, for example, Harlan Grant Cohen, Theorizing International
Precedent, in INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds., 2015); Krzsysztof
J. Pelc, The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
547 (2014); Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L.
DIS. SETTLE. 5 (2011); Mattias Derlen & Johan Lindlom, Peek-A-Boo, It’s A Case-Law System!
Comparing the European Court of Justice and the United States Supreme Court from a Network Perspective, 18
GERMAN L.J. 647 (2018). For judges at the domestic level, see, for example, John Zhuang Liu et al.,
Precedent and Chinese Judges: An Experiment, 69 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (2021); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN
& ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
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Yet stare decisis does not appear entirely restricted to the legal domain, or
to judges and lawyers. We occasionally see references to traditions, practices, and
even “precedents” of the past in other important places too. And these references
are sometimes accompanied by claims that call for respecting those traditions,
practices, or precedents even if some believe they are wrong for today.
Consider for instance the kid who demands that her parents let her stay up
late (or watch TV for just a bit longer) because that is what they used to allow
when her older siblings were the same age. Or consider commercial firms that
insist that lenders offer them loans on the same terms they used to offer in the
past just because that is what they did then. In advancing their claims, both the
kid and these firms clearly rely on stare decisis-like logic. And to the extent that
the parents and these lenders ultimately cave in despite having good reasons not
to, they are proving themselves amenable to it.
But can something like stare decisis appear in politics too? In other words,
can we realistically expect public officials across the enormously diverse
institutions of domestic and international politics to also “stand by things decided”
in the past even if they believe these decisions are wrong? Or when respecting
past decisions will operate against their more immediate interests?
It is understandable why many would dismiss the possibility of something
analogous to stare decisis in politics out of hand. After all, we do not normally
consider politics an arena that creates much constraint. And observing politics
around the world in this particular moment, which features officials ignoring,
discarding, or unsettling many traditions and practices of the past almost daily,10
suggests that this skepticism is doubly justified.
To take an especially blunt contemporary example from the U.S. for how
the past is treated so dismissively in politics: During President Barack Obama’s
final year in office, then Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell refused to
provide a hearing for Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, Judge Merrick Garland,
citing to an alleged political precedent that bars presidents from appointing a
Supreme Court justice in their final year in office.11 Fast forward to less than four

10
11

SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 47 (3d ed. 2007) ("Everybody knows that civil law courts
do use precedents.”). See also Anthony M. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032
(1990):
Respect for past decisions, for precedent, is not a characteristic of certain legal
systems only. It is rather a feature of law in general, and wherever there exists a
set of practices and institutions that we believe are entitled to the name of law,
the rule of precedent will be at work, influencing, to one degree or another, the
conduct of those responsible for administering the practices and institutions in
question.
See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Shrinking Constitution of Settlement, 68 DRAKE L. REV. 335 (2020).
See Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really
Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE
53 (2016) (discussing Senate Majority Leader McConnell’s claims and criticizing them on historical
grounds).
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years later, however, and McConnell, still Senate Majority Leader at the time, saw
no problem with proceeding with, and ultimately confirming, President Donald
Trump’s nominee to the Supreme Court, Justice Amy Coney Barrett, despite the
nomination also occurring during Trump’s final year in office.12
In contrast to the skepticism that our experience with politics justly breeds,
scholarship appears to present a much more optimistic view about the possibility
of something akin to stare decisis in politics. In particular, a growing body of work
has now identified crucial domains in which non-judicial institutions and officials
in both domestic and international politics also seem to stick, sometimes
powerfully so, with decisions of the past, very much like the kind of effects we
attribute to judicial stare decisis.13
As it currently stands, however, this literature is greatly incomplete. Much of
it focuses on a limited set of institutions in politics, which primarily resemble
judicial ones.14 Alternatively, this scholarship is mostly concerned with the
normative or interpretive question of how judges in domestic and international courts
should incorporate what appears to be a political analogy to stare decisis into legal
doctrine—for example, in the context of identifying customary international
norms or when interpreting domestic constitutional and statutory texts.15 As a
12

13

14

15

See Marianne Levine, McConnell Fends Off Accusations of Hypocrisy Over Holding Supreme Court Vote,
POLITICO (Sept. 21, 2020, 5:34 PM), https://perma.cc/46AZ-YDBC.
See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448
(2010); Jonathan S. Gould, Law Within Congress, 129 YALE L.J. 1946 (2020); Curtis A. Bradley &
Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012); Curtis
A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers,
105 GEO. L.J. 255 (2017); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984); Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 668 (2016); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING (1999); Anita S. Kirhsnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
1823 (2015); Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112,
137–41 (2011).
See Morrison, supra note 13 (focusing on the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice);
Gould, supra note 13 (focusing on the office of congressional parliamentarians); Michael R.
Dreeben, Stare Decisis in the Office of the Solicitor General, 130 YALE L.J. F. 541 (focusing on the Office
of the Solicitor General). For a more ambiguous example, see Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib,
Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259 (2015) (discussing the possibility of stare
decisis in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Executive Office of the U.S.
President).
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13 (elaborating a theory of historical gloss); Glennon, supra note
13 (discussing the use of past custom in constitutional interpretation); Roisman, supra note 13
(discussing the role of “acquiescence” to the past in constitutional interpretation); Nelson, supra
note 13 (discussing the role of original interpretive conventions and practices); Baude, supra note
13 (elaborating a theory of “constitutional liquidation” through past practice); WHITTINGTON, supra
note 13 (discussing “constitutional construction” by past practices); Krishnakumar, supra note 13
(discussing how courts should treat longstanding agency interpretations); Kozel & Pojanowski, supra
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result, we lack tools to understand how broad the phenomenon of constraint by
the past in politics really is. We are also left unsure about when and where to
expect this phenomenon to occur, how it operates in politics, and what we might
be able to do to facilitate more of this type of constraint. In a world where so
many valuable traditions and practices of the past appear to be all too easily
discarded for short-term political gains—partly given the rise of “traditionthreatening”16 regimes around the world and a “backlash against global norms and
institutions”17—this last inquiry seems particularly urgent.
In this Article, I seek to fill this gap in existing scholarship by developing a
comprehensive explanatory and functional theory of constraint by the past in
domestic and international politics—or, in short, a theory of political stare decisis.
Given the stakes of the past in politics today, I moreover suggest what public
officials and institutional designers in politics might be able to do to deliberately
“tinker” with political stare decisis. For instance, I consider how officials might
behave to establish completely new political precedents that will powerfully
constrain in the future; what they might do to strengthen existing political
precedents that they like (or weaken those they dislike); and what solutions are
available to make political stare decisis in general, and beyond specific political
precedents, more robust.
In Section II, I start by illustrating the conceptual and empirical possibility
of political stare decisis. I argue that the key to seeing why, notwithstanding
whatever skeptical intuitions we have, political stare decisis is possible and even
inevitable across the enormously diverse institutions of domestic and international
politics relates to the prevalence of what a burgeoning literature in law and the
social sciences terms political norms. More specifically, I argue that we can expect
political stare decisis to occur and systematically constrain officials in politics in
one of two conditions. The first is when political events or decisions serve as a
“proof” for the emergence (or previous existence) of a norm in domestic and
international politics. The second is when political institutions or environments

16

17

note 13. For a discussion of the role of past practice and custom in statutory interpretation in
jurisdictions outside the U.S., see Neil Duxbury, Custom as Law in English Law, 76 CAMB. L.J. 337
(2017); Marius van Staden, In Defence of Custom in Statutory Interpretation, 2020 J. S. AFR. L. 369. I note
that partial exceptions for this exclusively interpretive or normative focus are Mark Tushnet,
Legislative and Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339 (2008); Michael J. Gerhardt,
Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF
PRECEDENT 111–46 (2008). This Article, however, goes beyond these prior treatments by, among
other things, offering a comprehensive explanatory theory of political stare decisis.
Samuel Issacharoff & Trever Morrison, Constitution by Convention, 108 C ALIF. L. REV. 1913, 1920
(2020).
Peter Danchin et al., Navigating the Backlash Against Global Law and Institutions, in AUSTRALIAN
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (forthcoming 2021). See also Eric A. Posner, Liberal
Internationalism and the Populist Backlash, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 795 (2017); Erik Voeten, Populism and
Backlashes Against International Courts, 18 PERS. POL. 407 (2020).
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are characterized by another norm, but one that operates on the second-order level: a
norm that instructs public officials to generally respect decisions (or lessons learnt
from past events) even if they disagree with them. I argue that the existence of
such a norm is highly plausible across a wide variety of settings in domestic and
international politics for reasons that are very similar to those that enable the
parallel second-order norm we are familiar with from law: the norm of judicial stare
decisis.
In Sections III–VI, I theorize how political stare decisis operates “on the
ground,” including which decisions or events in domestic and international
politics are likely to establish constraining political precedents in the first place,
how public officials will reason with these precedents, and when and how political
precedents will be overruled. Since, as Section II shows, there is some resemblance
between political and judicial stare decisis, and given moreover that the latter is
familiar, my technique in these Sections is largely to compare and contrast the two
phenomena. And as I hope to show, this technique proves highly productive.
On one hand, as I show in Section III, this comparison illuminates important
commonalities in the way political and judicial stare decisis operate. For instance,
constraining political precedents can also arise from situations where events and
decisions in domestic and international politics sharply divide between winners
and losers—like how judicial precedents emerge from winning or losing cases in
courts. Moreover, officials in domestic and international politics will reason about
these political precedents and determine their applicability to the present in a
manner that tracks how judges and lawyers reason with judicial precedents (which
can be termed, as we will see, a common law-like way).
On the other hand, as I show in Sections IV–VI, the comparison also helps
emphasize that political stare decisis operates dramatically differently from how
judicial stare decisis is conventionally conceived. Among the key differences that
I will highlight, and later summarize in Tables 1–3, are:
(*) Political precedents can also arise from situations that do not have a clear
analogy to legal decisions that announce winners and losers (and which
involve, as we will see, political cooperation).
(*) While in law winning and losing a judgment has clear effects on the
establishment of judicial precedents, winning and losing in politics can have
perverse effects on political precedents (in particular, overzealous winners can
create political precedents that undermine the precedential effects of their
“win” and sore losers can aggravate the precedential effects of their “loss”).
(*) Contrary to judicial precedents, in many situations political precedents
will likely not emerge immediately—in “one go”—but only with time and
either cumulatively or in a retrospective fashion.
(*) Compared to judicial precedents, political precedents can prove very
fragile—for example, because they can be “overruled” without notice or
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explanation or because political precedents can become “anti-canonical”18
much more easily than judicial precedents.
(*) Conversely, there are also important cases where political precedents can
prove much more resilient and “sticky” than judicial precedents, particularly
when they reach a level of cognitive and political hegemony that allows them
to survive in the precedential pool even if in law they would have been easily
discarded already.
(*) And, finally, compared to judicial precedents, political precedents enjoy
a decreased level of “acoustic separation”19 from the public and must,
therefore, be much more attuned to the public in order to effectively
constrain.
Being able to identify these differences will also go a long way toward
figuring out what public officials might be able to do to deliberately “tinker” with
political stare decisis, a craft that I will call, in short, “precedenting” and which is
the topic of Section VII. For example, because political precedents are likely to be
generated only retrospectively or in a cumulative fashion, I argue that
precendenting requires continuous work and is not a “single-shot” enterprise as we
think of precedential constraint in the law. Moreover, since political precedents
tend to become anti-canonical more easily than judicial precedents, officials
should also be extremely mindful of their “image,” even to the point of excessively
valorizing them to make sure that they actually stick and constrain.
Of course, as we will see, sometimes political officials may want to weaken
political precedents instead of strengthening them. In these cases, I suggest that
public officials engage in precedenting in the opposite direction, which includes,
among other things, eliminating opportunities for the reaffirmation of political
precedents and increasing the chances that these precedents will indeed become
anti-canonical (even to the point of “trash-talking” or unfairly blaming these
precedents for policy failures).
Section VII also discusses two additional issues relating to the task of
precedenting. First, it asks who is likely to prove a more successful “precedentor”—
both in the sense of benefitting from existing political precedents and being able
to establish such precedents in the first place—and who is likely to be a less successful
precedentor. Second, Section VII identifies some solutions that institutional
designers can adopt to increase the force of political stare decisis more generally
and beyond the focus on specific political precedents.20
18

19

20

See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 382, 386 (2011) (defining anti canonical
precedents as, among other things, cases whose holdings “cannot reasonably be relied upon”
because they come to be perceived as “wrongly decided.”).
See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1983) (introducing and explaining the concept of “acoustic separation”).
See infra Tables 4–7.
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Throughout much of the discussion in the Article, I will frequently
emphasize the importance of the differences between political and judicial stare
decisis, at least as the latter is conventionally understood. But I conclude in Section
VIII with a twist: As we will see, much of what separates political and judicial stare
decisis has to do with certain “craft” norms that are prevalent in the legal
profession and that will likely not appear in politics. Yet, insights from legal
realism suggest that these craft norms are quite weak and far from strictly adhered
to. To the extent that this is true, I argue that the much of the basis for the
distinction between political and judicial stare decisis collapses. Instead of
completely divergent practices, judicial stare decisis is revealed to be nothing more
than one species of the broader phenomenon of political stare decisis.
I suggest in Section VIII that at least those who accept this legal realist
insight will benefit from seeing judicial stare decisis in this way. First, this political
gloss on judicial stare decisis highlights when judicial precedents are truly
constraining—in other words, when stare decisis is, as a common meme now puts
it, “for suckers”21 and when it is not. Second, this political gloss also flags new
ways to strengthen it in various jurisdictions where it seems to have dramatically
weakened in recent times, such as in the U.S., Israel, Canada, and India. Finally,
this gloss illuminates how those interested in achieving their goals through
domestic and international courts and their precedents should appropriately (and
effectively) approach this task.

II. T HE P OSSIBILITY OF P OLITIC AL S TARE D EC ISIS
A. An Initial Skepticism
Can we cogently speak of something like stare decisis in politics? Many might
sense that the idea is almost nonsensical. Let me unpack that intuition further
before attempting to refute it.
To be sure, public officials across the vast institutions of domestic and global
politics do regularly respect past decisions even if they disagree with them in one
common scenario. This happens most clearly when these decisions originate from
their political superiors. Consequently, politics has something analogous to what
we describe in the law as the practice of vertical precedents,22 in which lower courts
are expected to abide by the past decisions of higher-ranking ones. Yet, in
situations where such relation of hierarchy is absent in politics, which in law we
also describe as horizontal precedents,23 we seem to be standing on much weaker
ground. And skepticism is entirely understandable.

22

See Richard M. Re, Is “Stare Decisis…for Suckers”?, PRAWFSBLAWG (March 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/2QVM-RQJD.
See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2003).

23

See id.

21
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The reason for this is not that in politics references to the past (outside these
relations of institutional hierarchy) are entirely rare to begin with. True, in politics
we usually want to know why adopting one course over another is good for us
today, rather than why it was right for yesterday. In other words, our patience for
sticking with the “wrong” things in politics might be more limited than it is in
law.24 At the same time, invocations of the past do occasionally appear in politics.
In fact, it is far from unheard of for officials to invest significant resources in
trying to pin down what happened in the past before making decisions, even to
the point of “binging” the past.25
If not the total lack of past or historical references in politics, what primarily
fuels this sense of skepticism regarding the possibility of political stare decisis is
something else—namely, the difficulty of identifying cases in politics where the
past functions as a genuine constraint on officials. For one, when politicians
invoke the past in political argumentation, it is usually not to constrain decision
makers. Rather, the most frequent use of the past in politics is probably as a form
of persuasion—when public officials draw on “usable” past analogies to emphasize
why one political choice rather than another is in fact preferable today.26
But even when public officials explicitly refer to the past as a source of
constraint rather than mere persuasion, the credibility of such an argument could
easily be questioned. A public official who seems to be relying on the past as a
constraint may be suspected of using the past as “window dressing” or as
disguised persuasion.
One reason for the public’s suspicion of invoking the past as a constraint is
that it is quite rare to witness such an invocation when obedience to the past is
not also conducive to the official’s immediate goals. Indeed, politicians are often

24

25

26

Perhaps given the strong need in law to secure a “jurisprudential system that isn’t based upon an
‘arbitrary discretion.’” Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (citing THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)).
Hal Brands & Jeremi Suri, Introduction: Thinking about History and Foreign Policy, in THE POWER OF THE
PAST: HISTORY AND STATECRAFT 1 (Hal Brands & Jeremi Suri eds., 2015) (discussing how, during
a certain period of the Obama administration, national security officials were engaged in such
“binging” of the past).
The precise ways through which the past serves this purpose of persuasion vary. Sometimes those
invoking the past believe that it illustrates the contemporary wisdom of a desired course of action—
the past, in other words, is part of a process of learning. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST
MAY, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY FOR DECISION MAKERS (1986). At other times,
those who rely on the past wish to build on a specific kind of emotional attachment that they or
their audiences have with it. See, e.g., Andrew J. Taylor & John T. Rourke, Historical Analogies in the
Congressional Foreign Policy Process, 57 J. POL. 460 (1995) (finding that historical analogies in
congressional debates on foreign policy were utilized as “post-hoc justifications”); William Inboden,
Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties of Historical Experience: A Taxonomy, 37 J. STR. STUD. 291,
310–15 (2014) (identifying “public conscience mobilization,” “identity construction,” and
“existential succor” as functions of past references in politics).

504

Vol. 22 No. 2

Political Stare Decisis

Tamir

conceived of as caring only “about interests and power.”27 Even if they said they
will abide by the past before, it is more than reasonable to think that they will
“flip-flop”28 when adhering to the past no longer suits them. Another issue,
though, is that we may be suspicious of the accuracy of the account of the past
that politicians present. After all, public officials are often not historians (at least
not usually).29 Furthermore, and more importantly, any description of the past can
be easily questioned given that a choice is almost always involved when picking
among possible narratives or descriptions of the past.30 Then-U.S. Senate Majority
Leader McConnell’s claim31 that there is a precedent that limits presidents from
appointing Supreme Court Justices in their final year in office is a clear example
of this. It was an obvious case of a precedential claim that proved unreliable,
McConnell flip-flopped when it was convenient to do so. Many believe that
McConnell’s assertion was inaccurate from a historical point of view as well.32
This lack of credibility in invoking the past as a source for constraint is
ever-present in politics. It is, however, much more expressed in times of high
political polarization, which characterizes politics today in many places across the
globe.33 After all, in non-polarized times, it is relatively easy to find common
ground on what exactly the past entails and on the most persuasive narrative
through which we should view it. By contrast, during times of increased
polarization, the sense of “shared epistemic foundation”34 that makes choosing
between narratives of the past possible shrinks dramatically. And partisans

27

28

29

30

31
32

33

34

Ian Shapiro, Enough of Deliberation: Politics Is About Interests and Power, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS (Stephen
Macedo ed., 1999).
See, e.g., Maria Liasson, How Do We Define A Political Flop-Flop?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (JUL. 10, 2008),
https://perma.cc/C4EL-HVBG; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX.
L. REV. 485 (2016) (documenting pervasive flip-flops and self-interestedness in political position
taking).
The literature on what makes policymakers “bad” historians is vast. In addition to the sources cited supra
in notes 25–26, an influential publication, whose title dramatically conveys the message and the stakes, is
MARGARET MACMILLAN, DANGEROUS GAMES: THE USES AND ABUSES OF HISTORY (2009).
See generally Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131
HARV. L. REV. 96 (2017) (presenting a recent statement of this dynamic about the use of historical
references in politics).
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
See Kar & Mazzone, supra note 11. For an account that suggests that things may be more
complicated than that, see generally Chafetz, supra note 30.
See, e.g., Thomas Carothers & Andrew O’Donohue, Introduction, in DEMOCRACIES DIVIDED: THE
GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION (Thomas Carothers & Andrew O’Donohue
eds., 2019).
Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose A Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 130 (2018).
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become significantly invested in both promoting competing narratives of the past
and exposing the partisanship and one-sidedness of their opponents’ narratives.35
Politics in many domestic contexts and on the global arena exemplify this
dynamic with increasing frequency—where each side blames the other for
“unprecedented” behavior.36 Consequently, if we are to be forgiven for skepticism
that something like political stare decisis exists in general, we most certainly should
be forgiven for being skeptical that it exists in world politics today.

B. Complicating Our Intuitions
But the case against the existence of political stare decisis seems to have clear
limits. For one, the intuition on which it is based does not capture the entire world
of politics. It seems to have in mind the political dynamics that occur when
matters in politics involve “high stakes.” Domestic and international politics,
however, are more diverse than that. Indeed, much of politics is vastly more banal
than this picture assumes. In these circumstances, reliance on the past as a
constraint may both increase in frequency and become much more credible. And
while this sort of routine, day-to-day operation of politics is harder to observe—
perhaps because it is less “newspaper worthy,” memorable, or even visible—this
does not mean that we should not also search for (or care about) the constraining
force of the past and political stare decisis in these contexts.37
In addition, the intuitive case fails to account for an important difference
between the legal world and the world of domestic and international politics.
Although in law the expectation of addressing precedents of the past and
reasoning about them in the open is quite robust,38 in politics that expectation may
be weak and even nonexistent. In other words, the discursive burdens that are cast
on lawyers and judges to address past precedents are simply much heavier than

35

36

37

38

In ways that parallel what Duncan Kennedy terms the “hermeneutic of suspicion” in law. See
Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary American Legal Thought, 25 L. & CRIT.
91 (2014).
For the U.S., see Chafetz, supra note 30, at 107–08. For an example from world politics, see Jessica
Elgot, What Is Prorogation and Why Is Boris Johnson Using It?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://perma.cc/UG5N-KDF2.
In law, this claim appears under the rubric of “selection effects.” See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Legal
Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 757 (2013). In politics, a more fitting explanation is probably
availability or representativeness bias. See, e.g., Barbara Vis, Heuristics and Political Elites’ Judgment and
Decision-Making, 17 POL. STUD. REV. 41 (2019).
For law’s significant argumentative burdens, see, for example, PHILIPP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982) (identifying various modalities of constitutional
arguments in the form of a closed set); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1987).
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the ones that are cast on political decision makers.39 There are no strict “canons”
of interpretation or closed list “modalities” of argumentation in domestic and
international politics that give pride of place to the need to examine decisions of
the past. Political rhetoric is more open and less disciplined. Thus, we should be
careful not to draw quick conclusions about the existence of political stare decisis
from the way political argumentation operates. The past may constrain in politics
even if not explicitly uttered.
Finally, one must keep in mind the nature of constraint we should expect to
observe when searching for something like political stare decisis. After all, judicial
stare decisis in all the jurisdictions that embrace it today—including Canada, the
U.K., Australia, the U.S., and many more—is only a relative or presumptive
constraint, not an absolute one.40 It can be discarded in appropriate
circumstances.41 When considering the possibility that something like political
stare decisis exists, we must therefore recall this presumptive structure as well. It
would be a mistake, therefore, to simply infer from usages of the past as mere
persuasion in politics, or from the past’s insincere invocation as a constraint, the
total lack of political stare decisis. There remains the possibility that, in such
instances, the past was presumptively constraining even if it was ultimately not
dispositive. In these cases, the issue is not that there is no political stare decisis. It
may be that there is not enough of it.

C. Two Sources of Precedential Constraint (in Politics)
Having complicated the intuitive, skeptical case against political stare decisis,
let me now make an affirmative case for its existence. Consider three examples of
events or decisions in politics that have been identified as akin to “political
precedents” and therefore as evidence for what I call political stare decisis:

39

40

41

See generally David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha, Anti-Modalities, 119 MICH. L. REV. 729 (2021)
(emphasizing the differences between legal reasoning and other modes of reasoning, including
political reasoning).
On the U.S., see Steven J. Burton, The Conflict Between Stare Decisis and Overruling in Constitutional
Adjudication, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1687 (2014). The usual reference for this view of stare decisis in
case law in the U.S. is Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (stare decisis is not an
“inexorable command”). On Canada, see Debra Perks, Precedent Unbound? Contemporary Approaches to
Precedent in Canada, 32 MAN. L.J. 135, 137 (2006). On other countries, see Cruz Oliviera & Garoupa,
supra note 1.
For memorable examples of the presumptive nature of stare decisis in the U.S., see, for example,
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (effectively overruling Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905)); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). For the presumptive nature of precedential constraint and stare
decisis outside the U.S., see generally INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D.
Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).
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(*) In the U.S. in 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt failed in implementing
his program to “pack” the Supreme Court. Until today, and despite some
recent pressures, many still describe this incident as establishing a political
precedent against changing the number of U.S. Supreme Court justices.42
(*) In the U.K. in 1976, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced to his
Cabinet that he “would resign as Prime Minister as soon as the Parliamentary
Labour Party had completed the necessary constitutional procedures for
electing a new Leader.”43 Until today, this decision is referred to as the “Wilson
precedent”44 according to which prime ministers who wish to resign must wait
before they do so until their substitute is definitively chosen by their party.45
(*) In Canada in 1992, a consultative referendum on whether to approve the
Charlottetown Accord, proposing a major overhaul of the Canadian
Constitution, had been initiated. This referendum ended up being rejected by
the electorate and the Accord was never implemented. Until today, many
believe that this established an important political precedent according to
which, despite the lack of legal obligation in Canada to rely on referendums in
the context of constitutional amendments, such a referendum is effectively
required, at least for significant constitutional amendments.46
My claim in what follows is that identifying these past political events or
decisions as “precedents” is far from farfetched. These can indeed constrain
public officials even against their powerful interests, much like we think of
precedents in law. This can occur under one of two conditions. The first is when
these decisions or events “signal” the existence of what legal and social science
literature calls political norms. The second is if the political systems in the U.S., the
U.K., and Canada are characterized by another political norm, but of a
second-order nature: a norm of political stare decisis. I discuss each condition in
turn.

42

See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465,
512–17 (2018). For how this precedent has been exposed to important degree of pressure, see, for
example, Mark Tushnet, Court-Packing on the Table in the United States?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 3,
2019), https://perma.cc/7HRG-G3UW.

43

RODNEY BRAZIER, CHOOSING
(2020).

44

Id.
The “Wilson precedent” is now codified in the U.K. Cabinet Manual. See CABINET OFFICE, THE
CABINET MANUAL, Chapter 2 para. 2.18 (2011).
See Jeffrey Simpson, The Referendum and Its Aftermath, in THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD, THE
REFERENDUM, AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA 193, 193 (Kenneth McRoberts & Patrick J. Monahan
eds., 1993); Mary Dawson, From the Backroom to the Front Line: Making Constitutional History or
Encounters with the Constitution: Patriation, Meech Lake, and Charlottetown, 57 MCGILL L.J. 955, 997
(2012).

45

46
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1. Political norms and the past events that cause them to emerge
Perhaps there was a time when we could divide the political world into two
neat boxes of “politics” and “law.” If so, this is certainly not the case today. Law
is no longer recognized as the exclusive domain of constraint in governmental
affairs. Literature on politics and constitutionalism now fully recognizes an
additional category of restraint—that of political norms.47
Political norms are very much like the social norms that exist in our nonpolitical lives, such as norms against smoking in public or against overt sexual
discrimination.48 For present purposes, political norms have two principal
characteristics. First, they determine “rules of conduct” that instruct public
officials what to do or what to avoid doing in politics. These “rules” are usually
informal in nature and not written down.49 Second, political norms constrain
decision makers’ choices in politics beyond the bounds of the law.50 This
constraint can, in principle, stem from two distinct sources. Sometimes it stems
from the possibility of political sanctions that may ensue should public officials
not abide by what the norms dictates. These sanctions can be of various kinds
depending on context, and include shame or embarrassment, loss of employment,
or diminished likelihood of reelection.51 Other times, though, the constraint can
be independent of such sanctions and stem from the concern that, by refusing to
adhere to a norm, public officials may be encouraging others to defect from certain
cooperative arrangements, even though these officials have a long-term interest in
maintaining them.52
47

48

See Adrian Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1949 (2016) (arguing that political
“conventions” constrain executive discretion).
The literature on political norms is now vast. For particularly valuable contributions, see, for
example, Jon Elster, Unwritten Constitutional Norms (Feb. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://perma.cc/YPN8-764G; Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523
(2004) [hereinafter Tushnet, Hardball]; Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013); Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions
in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847; David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers,
124 YALE L.J. 2 (2014); Mark Tushnet, The Pirate’s Code: Constitutional Conventions in U.S. Constitutional
Law, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 481 (2018) [hereinafter Tushnet, The Pirate’s Code]; Daphna Renan, Presidential
Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018); Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional
Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177 (2018). For my own attempt to contribute
to this literature, see Oren Tamir, Constitutional Norm Entrepreneuring, 80 MD. L. REV. 881 (2021).

49

See, e.g., Jonathan S. Gould, Codifying Constitutional Norms, 109 GEO. L.J. 703 (2021).

50

Jon Elster puts this condition in slightly different terms by describing norms as possessing “causal
efficacy.” See Elster, supra note 48, at 36.
See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 48, at 1182.
In game theoretical terms, there is an important distinction between coordination and cooperation
arrangements or games. In coordination games, all players benefit from the equilibrium where
parties coordinate their behavior, even if they may prefer a different sort of coordinating
arrangement. By contrast, in cooperation games, players have short-term interests to defect. See

51
52

Winter 2022

509

Chicago Journal of International Law

As ample literature has now shown, political norms are pervasive in domestic
and global politics, much like the norms in our social lives.53 But what, precisely,
is the connection between these norms and political stare decisis? How can
political norms give the past a constraining force in politics?
To see this, we need to address how political norms emerge. The issue is
complex because the processes that lead to the emergence of norms are somewhat
mysterious.54 Nonetheless, there is little doubt that much of what is involved in
the generation of norms depends on the sources of information from which
people can learn what other people believe and expect. Indeed, information is the
lifeblood of norms. Absent relevant information, it is simply impossible to learn
about the chance of establishing cooperative arrangements in politics or about the
existence of expectations that apply to official conduct.
There are many available sources for the information that is crucial for the
emergence of political norms. Much depends on whom we take our cues from.55
The media certainly has a role56 and so do “opinion leaders.”57 And it is not
surprising that norms have been found especially effective in “close-knit”58
environments where exchange of information is relatively easy and trustworthy.
For present purposes, however, one source of information dissemination is
particularly important: the informational power of political events or of political
decisions. Indeed, certain events or decisions in politics can have a dramatic, indeed
decisive, effect on the emergence of norms. These events or decisions can deliver
information to those who participate in them, observe them, or learn about them
in hindsight about the potential emergence of a political norm that applies to
them. More specifically, they can illustrate that there are prevalent beliefs that
some political conduct will simply not be tolerated going forward and so subject
actors to relevant political sanctions. Alternatively, they can serve as evidence of

53

54

55

56

57
58

Elster, supra note 48, at 36, 43–44. See generally Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma:
Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009). For present purposes, I bracket
the importance of this distinction and lump both coordination and cooperation under the category
of “cooperation.” I will relax this simplification later. See notes 201–07 and accompanying text.
See supra sources cited in note 48. For the international context, see generally Jack L. Goldsmith &
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999).
See, e.g., Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon, Social Norms, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (March 1, 2011),
https://perma.cc/BG9P-7BTJ (highlighting that norms arise as “the unplanned, unexpected result” of
human interaction).
The relevant technical term is “cascade.” See, e.g., Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion,
Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992).
For a study of evolution of social norms that emphasizes the role played by the media, see Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping
Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 539–42 (2003).
Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 16–17 (2001).
See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
359 (2003).
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the emergence of a cooperative arrangement, which parties may have a long-term
interest to uphold, has been potentially established.59
When events or decisions have this sort of informational value—that is,
when they signal or serve as a kind of political “proof”60 for the potential
emergence of a political norm, these events will likely have significant “pull” on
political behavior. Simply put, public officials will tend to take these events or
decisions as constraining “precedents” that limit their future options, very much
like we see in judicial stare decisis in law. And they will do so because they are
concerned about the consequences of breaking a political norm.
Returning to the examples at the beginning of this Section, we can now see
why they may indeed credibly constrain public officials. One potential explanation
for this is that these examples are exactly the kinds of events or decisions in
politics that have the sort of informational value discussed above; they signal that
certain political norms have begun emerging: a norm against changing the number
of Supreme Court justices (in the U.S.), a norm against allowing prime ministers
to resign before their substitutes have been chosen (in the U.K.), or a norm that
compels the use of referenda prior to major constitutional amendments (in
Canada).

2. Political stare decisis as a second-order norm
The story does not end here, though. We need to consider the possibility of
another source that can provide the past with a constraining force: the existence of
a practice in politics that instructs public officials to generally honor the past and
not merely in specific instances as discussed before.
It is easy to imagine why officials may regularly want to adhere to the past.
Sensible decision makers in domestic and international politics may find it
appealing because of the complexity of the issues with which they are confronted61
or because of the limited resources they have to revisit new issues that come
before them.62 Some public officials may also find general adherence to the past
59

60

61

62

See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 352–53 (2000)
(highlighting that one possible way through which people may come to realize the existence of
norms is when they “observe and interpret the behavior of others”) (emphasis in the original).
This is my adaptation of a term that appears in ROBERT H. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE—HOW AND WHY
PEOPLE AGREE TO DO THINGS 117 (1984) (discussing how events and behavior constitute “social
proof” about the existence of norms).
See David Patrick Houghton, The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations, 26 BRIT.
J. POL. SCI. 523 (1996).
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1339–40 (suggesting that public officials may generally benefit
from adopting something like judicial stare decisis in the interest of saving time). Cf. Franklins Pty
Ltd v. Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603 at 685 [332] (Australia):
[T]he operation of the system of precedent provides an invaluable service to the
effective operation of the law, by enabling a new start to be made from time to
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attractive because they are acutely aware of their own historical position and wish
to be associated with continuing a certain historical arc.63 At times, public officials
may even be drawn to it in less conscious ways—perhaps because they are
particularly risk-averse (or work within institutions that have a particularly
heightened “risk culture”),64 exhibit a “déjà vu syndrome,”65 or simply lack in
imagination.66 The past might even have a comforting power on political decision
makers.67
All these situations are plausible but are ultimately fragile in terms of the
degree of constraint they generate. They are highly dependent on the decision
maker’s reliability and consistency. But even if that level of reliability or
consistency can be reasonably expected, the arrangements may prove temporary
at best. They might hold so long as the relevant officials maintain their positions,
but not necessarily when these officials are ultimately replaced. Can the past be
internalized more powerfully than that in this general sense?
My suggestion is that the answer is yes. This will happen when the
commitment to sticking to the past becomes a political norm in and of itself—when,
in other words, if abiding by the past becomes in a particular political institution

63

64

65

66

67

time, on the basis of a principle recently adopted by the High Court, that makes
unnecessary what would otherwise be a time-consuming and difficult analysis
of case law.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 318 (1819):
[A] doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause and the human
judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty
are not concerned, but the respective powers of those who are equally the
representatives of the people, are to be adjusted, if not put at rest by the practice
of the Government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that
practice.
They possess, in other words, an intense preference for historical association or integrity. Consider,
for instance, the following description of former national security adviser to U.S. President Nixon,
Henry Kissinger: “More than any chief foreign affairs policymaker in U.S. history, he decided his
actions and measured his accomplishments with his eye on the fit between history’s long stream
and his own brief moment.” Robert L. Beisner, History and Henry Kissinger, 14 DIPLOM. HIST. 511,
511 (1990).
See, e.g., Barry Bozeman & Gordon Kingsley, Risk Culture in Public and Private Organizations, 58 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 109 (1998).
See Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-Intuitive Historians: Applied History
and Its Shortcomings, 30 INT’L. STUD. Q. 223, 235 (1986) (defining decision makers who suffer from
such a syndrome as having a “strong sense of history, and to them the past is a living reality to be
almost always consulted and a rod against which present and future realities are to be measured”).
For a recent fascinating discussion, see Avshalom M. Schwartz, Political Imagination and Its Limits,
199 SYNTHESE 3325 (2020).
This is suggested in a new draft essay by Professor Jeremy Waldron. See Jeremy Waldron, ‘A Previous
Instance’—Yamamoto and the Uses of Precedent 19 (N.Y.U. Sch. L. Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 21-51, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3937519.
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or setting a second-order norm that regulates how public officials should generally
make their decisions.68
That this can in principle occur should not surprise. It is exactly how we
should view stare decisis in law. True, we may have good reasons to value judicial
stare decisis because of the need for stability, epistemic humility, and integrity
(among others).69 But, to the extent that stare decisis actually explains judicial
behavior and decision-making in a more systemic way, which also makes realistic
assumptions about judicial behavior, it is precisely because of its potential
effectiveness as a second-order norm.70 In other words, judges who fail to address
or reason on the basis of the constraining force of precedents are in some
important sense breaching expectations about their proper role, expectations that
originate either from their peers in the legal profession, on the bench, or from the
public at large.71 Additionally, judges who refuse to embrace stare decisis and the
constraining force of precedents signal to others on the bench their
uncooperativeness, which, in turn, may undermine their ability to make sure some
judgments that they themselves care about will stick.72
I will have more to say about the efficacy and working of this second-order
norm of judicial stare decisis in Section III and VIII. For now, the key puzzle to
focus on is this: Is there some sound reason to think that the norm of stare decisis
is unique to the legal context? It is hard to see why. Indeed, the exact similar forces
that make judicial stare decisis possible can also support a parallel second-order
norm in domestic and international politics: a norm of political stare decisis.
Begin with the cooperative logic behind the norm of judicial stare decisis.
Public officials in domestic and international politics, like judges in the law, almost
always work in an environment where they would benefit from the cooperation
of others whom they interact with on a regular, repeat basis. They also want some
decisions to stick and require the help of others to make sure they do (both within

68

69

70

71
72

For the idea of second-order decision-making, see generally Cass R. Sunstein & Edna
Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5 (1999).
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2012).
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed through the Lens of Hartian Positivist
Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107 (2008).
See, e.g., Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1021 (1996).
See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist, Stare Decisis as Reciprocity Norm, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 173,
175 (Charles G. Geyh ed., 2011). To be sure, the preference for “settlement” can vary in contexts and
with judges. It can stem from the judge’s approval of the previous precedent substantively, her desire to
decrease her workload, her sincere belief in the value of legal “craft,” or her desire that the body of
doctrine be rationally comprehensible and acceptable. The literature on the topic is vast and is surveyed
effectively in Fallon, Jr., supra note 70.
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specific political institutions and between them).73 And embracing a kind of informal
decision protocol that instructs adherents to regularly respect what was “decided”
in the past can be one effective way, just as in law, that public officials can signal
their general willingness to cooperate and to encourage others to reciprocate.74
Furthermore, public officials in domestic and international politics, much
like lawyers and judges, may also be exposed to the possibility of substantial
penalties if they regularly diverge from past decisions or lessons learnt from past
events. First, these penalties can originate from the institutions of politics
themselves, whether it is legislatures, executives, administrative agencies, or any
other political organization at either the domestic or international level. As many
have highlighted, these institutions often develop a sense of “institutional
loyalty”75 that calls for their officials to adhere to past decisions, no matter whether
they personally happen to agree with them. And officials within these institutions
who break with that loyalty can accordingly find themselves exposed to significant
costs, whether these are material costs or others.76
Second, penalties for not abiding by the past in politics might also stem from
the reality of political professionalization. As growing literature demonstrates,
domestic and international politics has been substantially professionalized in
recent decades,77 so much so that it is now common to speak of the existence of
73

For one classical analysis of the collective action problem that a political institution such as the
legislature faces, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). Similar analysis has been extended to other
political institutions and contexts. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It:
Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005); Daryl J.
Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005). For the
collective action problem on the inter-institutional level, see, for example, Aziz Z. Huq, The
Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014), and at the international level, see,
for example, Annmaria Orban, How to Solve International Collective Action Problems? Cooperation for
Preserving the Global Environment, 25 SOC’Y & ECON. 97 (2003).

74

See Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compliance, and Change in Customary International
Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L. L. 389, 390 (2014). Though Professors Verdier and
Voeten’s discussion is in the context of international affairs, I believe their argument can be
generalized and applied to other political contexts, including to domestic politics. See also Jack
Goldsmith & Daryl J. Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1792 (2009) (discussing similarities between international relations and domestic
politics). From a game theoretical point of view, my argument is essentially that the norm of political
stare decisis is either a kind of coordination norm about what is considered as a cooperative move
or a cooperation norm that operates on the second-order level. Cf. McAdams, supra note 52, at 228.
David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2018).
See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
See Fontana & Huq, supra note 75, at 20–25 (discussing the relevant costs of institutional disloyalty).
See, e.g., Gordon S. Black, A Theory of Professionalization in Politics, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 865 (1970)
(discussing the increased professionalization of U.S. politics); Jean d’Aspremont, The
Professionalisation of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A PROFESSION 19 (Jean
d’Aspremont et al. eds., 2017) (same for international politics).
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a domestic and international “political class.”78 This professionalization by
definition brings with it a certain set of expectations about the way public officials
in politics ought to conduct themselves in relevant dealings with other officials. 79
And one such expectation may involve a sense of political fairness, which can
include the expectation that it is important to abide by “things decided” in the
past, even if those who are required to do so think past decisions are wrong
today.80
Finally, the public might also be an important source of political discipline
and an originator of a norm of political stare decisis. Indeed, it is far from
unimaginable that the public itself develops a special taste for respecting the past
in domestic and international politics. After all, the public may not have the
patience to reopen issues that seem to have been settled previously. And it may
expect some measure of fairness in its public officials’ dealings too, which may
entail abiding by what was previously settled.81 For the public, in short, an
unprecedented political behavior can also be a “dirty word.”82
Returning to the examples in the beginning of this Section, we can now see
an additional reason they may in fact constrain public officials. Even if these past
decisions or events do not have the informational value that signals the potential
emergence (or previous existence) of first-order political norms, the lessons
implied by them will be followed and constrain if political systems (in the above
examples, those of the U.S., the U.K., and Canada) exhibit the conditions that
facilitate the creation of a norm of political stare decisis.
***
To recap: My claim in this Section has been that notwithstanding potentially
strong intuitions to the contrary, political stare decisis is real. The past can exert
credible constraint in politics. Two conditions make it so. First, the past can have
a “compliance pull”83 in domestic and international politics when political
decisions or events of the past contain information that indicates the emergence,
or confirm the previous existence, of a political norm that officials believe applies
to them. These events will then have a stare decisis-like “effect,” so to speak.
Second, the past can prove constraining in politics if the relevant political
78

79
80
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82
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See, e.g., Peter Allen & Paul Cairney, What Do We Mean When We Talk about the “Political Class”?, 15
POL. STUD. REV. 18 (2017).
See Herbert B. Asher, The Learning of Legislative Norms, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 499 (1973).
For the claim that people are strongly motivated by their sense of fairness, see generally TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
See Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers, 32 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 421, 426 (2012)
(discussing the plausibility of a “political precedent heuristic” that publics use to judge political
affairs).
See Chafetz, supra note 30, at 96.
I draw this term from THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 43
(1990).
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environment gives rise to a norm instructing officials to respect the past in general
terms, what I have called a second-order norm of political stare decisis.
Some clarifications and qualifications are in order before I proceed with my
claims. First, note that the issue is ultimately an empirical one. Political events or
decisions that have the relevant informational value to support or prove the
emergence of a first-order political norm (or confirm it) may succeed in delivering
it, but they may also fail.84
Similarly, the question of whether politics in a particular environment is
indeed characterized by the cooperative or sanction-based conditions that may
give rise to a norm of political stare decisis discussed above is, again, an open one
and must be tested empirically. My own view, for what it is worth, is that these
conditions generally exist in mature democratic systems as well as in the
international system. The fact that both public officials and commentators in
domestic and international politics speak regularly about the prospect that some
particular event or decision will generate a “precedent” in politics is, I believe,
strong evidence of that.85 It reflects an awareness not only of the possibility that
some events will give life to political norms of the first-order but also, and I think
more plausibly in many cases, of the cooperative and sanction-based conditions
that give life to a norm of political stare decisis.
Second, by suggesting that the past can constrain in politics and that political
stare decisis is real, I do not mean to imply that the constraint produced by it
would necessarily be a powerful one. As we will see below, this issue is complex
and depends on a multitude of factors, including the robustness of the political
norms in question, the political stakes of the matter, the opportunities politics
happen to present for decision makers, and these decision makers’ savvy and
sophistication.
Again, I will have more to say about all of this in due course. For now, let
me bracket these issues and forge ahead.

84

We will see later that one reason they might fail to do so has to do with the greater involvement of
the public in politics. See infra VI.
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For a recent illustration in the U.S. context, see Bob Bauer, The Trump Impeachment and the Question of
Precedent, LAWFARE (Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/F7CN-FKAZ. And for extensive exposition of the
use of precedential rhetoric in the context of presidential powers in the U.S., see generally Deborah
Pearlstein, The Executive Branch Anticanon, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2020). For an example from the
U.K., see Annette Dittert, The Politics of Lies: Boris Johnson and the Erosion of the Rule of Law, THE NEW
STATESMAN (July 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/B8VD-4EFZ. And for an example from the
Australian context, see Peter H. Hogg, The Governor’s General’s Suspension of Parliament: Duty Done or
Perilous Precedent?, in PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS (P. H. Russell & Lorne Sossin eds.,
1983).
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III. S TARE D E C ISIS : IN L AW AND IN P OLITIC S
Section II argued that political stare decisis is real and identified two sources
from which it can possibly originate. But how exactly does political stare decisis
“behave”? More specifically, which events or decisions will likely emerge as
constraining political precedents? How will officials reason with these precedents and
decide to apply them to contemporary events? And when and how are these
precedents likely to be overruled?
In law and in relation to the practice of judicial stare decisis, we seem to have
good answers to these questions. Accordingly, and especially now that we have
seen that there may be a norm of political stare decisis that resembles judicial stare
decisis, it seems only logical to inquire if there are similarities between them also
at this operational level rather than work on a blank slate. This is what I do next.

A. Does the Law Analogy Make Sense?
For some, the attempt to compare judicial and political stare decisis may
seem inapposite. And on initial reflection, this intuition seems powerful, simply
because the differences between the legal world and the world of domestic and
international politics appear far too significant for judicial stare decisis to serve as
a useful analogy for the operation of political stare decisis.
To be sure, there are important debates and controversies concerning many
issues related to the operation of judicial stare decisis.86 Nonetheless, it is hard to
deny that there is some measure of consensus about judicial stare decisis as well.
For example, there is little controversy that for a legal precedent to be established,
a court that possesses the authority to decide the matter should have reached the
decision. There is little controversy, too, that a judicial precedent is set when a
judgment garners a specific number of votes.87 Even within the debates being
waged about the practice of judicial stare decisis, there is some important
agreement worth flagging. All agree, for instance, that written judicial opinions
play an important role in determining the precedent’s scope.88 And there are also
legal metrics that lawyers and judges tend to systematically apply to the analysis of
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88

Compare Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v.
Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010), with Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1861 (2014).
In many systems a simple majority will usually be enough, but, in some instances, a supermajority
might be required. See, e.g., Joon Seok Hong, Signaling the Turn: The Supermajority Requirement and
Judicial Power on the Constitutional Court of Korea, 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 177 (2019).
See Schauer, supra note 6, at 444.
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judicial precedents—metrics that, like judicial stare decisis, are themselves in a
sense “craft” norms of the legal profession.89
This consensus is again quite thin and leaves much in the practice of judicial
stare decisis open to debate. But even this thin consensus is essential to judicial
stare decisis’s functioning. Consider, for instance, how judicial stare decisis would
operate absent the idea that some specific courts or panels have authority to make
precedents that bind future decisions. Or consider how judicial stare decisis would
work without the recognition that a precedent is set after a judgment has garnered
the requisite number of votes of the authoritative panel, or without the existence
of any written opinion. Without doubt, these changes would dramatically
transform judicial stare decisis itself.
But this is exactly what we seem to have in both domestic and international
politics. No parallel institution authoritatively can render political decisions that
have a constraining effect on the future.90 Political precedents might originate
from a myriad set of institutions or settings, not just one.91 Moreover, in many of
the settings from which political precedents arise, no rule or practice necessarily
indicates that what has transpired is in fact decisive about what comes next.
Events in politics do not, in the same way as judicial decisions, announce that they
“hereby create a political precedent” that public officials should follow in the
future. They most certainly do not announce that they signal the emergence or
existence of a political norm whose force can, as we saw in Section II, constrain
public officials and give life to political stare decisis.
Politics is also much more informal than law. Often there are no written
opinions in politics. Even when a text exists, it is often written by someone other
than the relevant public official who rendered the precedential political decision
or was personally involved in the precedent-generating event.92 In other words,
there is often no unique “canonical” expression to political precedents.
Finally, politics seems to lack even the minimal metrics or standards that
regulate how legal argumentation works—the “craft” norms that exist in the legal
89

90
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For these craft norms, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword:
Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27
(2011). Cf. RICHARD H. FALLON JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 88 (2018)
(“American constitutional law is . . . constituted by the shared understandings, expectations, and
intentions.”). And for these craft norms in the context of judicial stare decisis in the U.S., see BRYAN
GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 18 (2016) (seeking to provide a treatise that
offers a “conventional description of contemporary practice useful to the working lawyer and
judge”).
Recall that the phenomenon of interest here is akin to horizontal, not vertical precedents. See supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam
and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1383 (1994) (“[T]here are as many kinds of precedent as there
are constitutional institutions creating them.”).
Indeed, the written account of a political event can come from an eyewitness or even from hearsay.
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profession.93 Thus, even if a norm of political stare decisis exists and instructs
officials to generally respect “things decided” in the past, or political precedents,
its operation seems wholly unpredictable.

B. Modeling Political Stare Decisis on Law
Not so fast. While the worlds of domestic and international politics
undoubtedly differ from the legal one, thinking about political precedents in
similar terms to those we use to conventionally describe judicial precedents is far
from a stretch. The legal analogy can reveal important insights into the operation
of political stare decisis.

1. Political authoritativeness
For one, politics does not lack the idea of authoritativeness that exists in law
and makes judicial stare decisis workable. Though political precedents can be
generated from a diverse set of institutions, it is unlikely that any political
institution can determine a precedent for any other institution. For instance, an
internal political precedent in the executive branch in one jurisdiction generated
by that branch’s official will not bind a legislator if that precedent has no relevance
outside that branch. And a completely internal political precedent in the legislature
will similarly not be able to constrain an official of the executive branch. 94 For
each institution in domestic and international politics, and the public officials who
operate within them, then, the list of potential political precedents is not infinite
or wholly unpredictable. There is clearly some notion of authoritativeness
operating in politics as well.95

2. Political decisiveness: winners and losers
Additionally, events in politics sometimes appear decisive in ways that highly
resemble the decisiveness we attribute to judicial judgments. One obvious
93
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See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13, at 262 (discussing the lack of a legal “metric” for determining
the meaning of past practices in politics).
See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Practice Makes Precedent, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 32, 35–36 (2017).
Two comments seem appropriate here. First, this notion of political authoritativeness can stem
either from formal law or from informal political norms. For some of the complications that can
arise in law, at least in the context of the U.S., see generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120
COLUM. L. REV. 613 (2020). For discussion of the role of informal political norms in shaping
notions of authoritativeness in politics, see RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF
LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 98 (2015). Second, the notion of authoritativeness in politics may prove
“fuzzy,” at least around the edges. This is so because there are two levels at play. On one level,
there is a difference between public officials that serve or represent different institutions. On
another level, though, everyone belongs to the broader category of “public officials.” Much, then,
will depend on the level of abstraction with which actions will be taken. Cf. Daphna Renan, The
President’s Two Bodies, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (2020) (illustrating this dynamic or “two bodies”
problem with respect to the position of the U.S. president).
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example is when political institutions are “quasi-judicial” and issue written and
often thickly reasoned statements that have pretensions about setting a future
course. The office of the Attorney-General in the U.K. and the Office of Legal
Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice (OLC), both of which have recently
garnered important political and scholarly attention, are salient illustrations in
domestic politics.96 But quasi-judicial political institutions are common also in the
international arena, and in fact increasingly so—part of what has been called the
“judicialization of international relations.”97
However, even when political institutions operate in less “judicialized”
forms, similar decisiveness to what we see in law can be achieved in domestic and
international politics. This seems to occur most clearly when political events serve
the most basic function attributed to judicial opinions in courts of law: first, they
present a sharply “competitive and polarized”98 dispute and, second, they appear
to resolve that dispute decisively, indicating who the winners and losers are and,
by implication, what politics seems to allow or prohibit.
There are at least three distinct ways that such decisive resolution can be
achieved in politics. First, decisive political resolution can stem from the way
political contests or standoffs ultimately end. Indeed, when a political contest is at play
in which one side is clearly trying to achieve some sort of political action while the
other is clearly trying to block it, the decisive success or failure of either of the
sides might plausibly give rise to claims for the existence of political precedents.
Second, such decisive political resolution can arise from authoritative political
decisions. As previously mentioned, any institution has public officials authorized
to “speak” for it.99 And when these officials make decisions, and when these
decisions are moreover made against the background of a sufficiently
“competitive and polarized” dispute, they can give rise to forceful claims of
constraining political precedents even if they don’t seem exactly like decisions in
a court of law.
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98
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For discussion of the position of the U.K Attorney-General in the context of recent controversies,
see, for example, Klearchos A. Kyriakides, The Law Officers of the Crown and the Rule of Law in the United
Kingdom, in PUBLIC SENTINELS 185 (Gabrielle Appleby et al. eds., 2014). For discussion of the Office
of Legal Counsel, see, for example, Morrison, supra note 13. For changes that OLC has experienced
in recent years and that put pressure on its “quasi-judicial” nature, see Daphna Renan, The Law
Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805 (2017). For a somewhat similar example, see Gould, supra note
13.
See, e.g., Karen J. Alter et al., Theorizing the Judicialization of International Relations, 63 INT’L. STUD. Q.
449, 453 (2019)
Paul A. Anderson, Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision Making, 25 J. POL. SCI.
738, 743 (1981).
See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
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Finally, decisive political resolution that might generate political precedents
can occur when the institutions of politics do rely, as in law, on a voting procedure to
arrive at political determinations.
All of these have some important support in real political dynamics. For
instance, the “court-packing” precedent from the U.S.100 seems to fit the mold of
a political precedent that has been established after a sharp political standoff was
decisively resolved. The “Wilson precedent” to delay resignation until a successor
to the British prime minister is chosen101 seems to capture the way authoritative
decisions in politics, even if lacking judicial characteristics, can prove precedential.
And the potential of voting outcomes to establish political precedents is also
supported by various examples. The way the failed referendum for the approval
of the Charlottetown Accord in Canada created a precedent for compelling
referenda in advance of major constitutional amendments is clearly relevant
here.102 But there are other illustrations. For instance, U.S. President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s electoral wins that allowed him to serve a third and fourth
consecutive presidential term occurred against a widespread belief that presidents
could not serve more than two consecutive terms. Accordingly, these “wins” were
believed by many to generate precedents according to which presidents could in
fact serve more than two consecutive terms (at least prior to the restoration of
this limit through the ratification of the Constitution’s Twenty-Second
Amendment).103
Moreover, in 1962, French President Charles de Gaulle initiated a referendum
on changing the presidential election process. At the time, many believed that the
constitution prohibited referendums in such circumstances.104 Nonetheless, de
Gaulle’s referendum proved successful and, later, was viewed by some as a
precedent according to which the French Constitution now allows the adoption of
amendments in this manner.105 Finally, in the U.K., the executive branch is
traditionally believed to possess unilateral authority to engage in military affairs
without parliamentary approval.106 In 2013, however, the British government agreed
to hold a vote in Parliament on the question of whether it would commit its armed
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See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

101

See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See generally MICHAEL J. KORZI, PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS
PRINCIPLES, & POLITICS 124–42 (2011).
See Elster, supra note 48, at 33.
Id.
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See Claire Mills, Parliamentary Approval for Military Action, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY BRIEFING
PAPER NO. 7166 at 4 (May 8, 2018).
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forces to a military action in Syria.107 The government ended up losing that vote.108
To this day, many consider this a crucial political precedent according to which
Parliament should be involved in some way in the future and that the government
can no longer act unilaterally in these matters.109

3. Reasoning about precedents in law and politics
So far, I have suggested that politics can be both authoritative and decisive
in ways that resemble judicial precedents. Let me now add a final similarity
between politics and law in this context: the way public officials in politics reason
about political precedents may not be that different from the way judges and
lawyers reason about judicial precedents.
Note first that it is not clear that politics lacks “craft” norms that regulate
political argumentation in ways similar to how legal craft norms regulate legal
arguments. As mentioned above, politics has been professionalized to a great
extent in recent decades.110 And every process of professionalization always carries
with it not only an expectation of fairness—which brings the possibility of political
stare decisis in the first place—but some sort of regulation of the permissible
scope of argumentation.111
Moreover, law and politics consistently interact. As is well known, lawyers
exert a significant influence on politics, either because many political institutions
are exposed to judicial scrutiny and consist of lawyers (who are either serving in
legal positions112 or political positions, given that many politicians have legal
training)113 or because lawyers, including law professors, are active and often
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See Philippe Lagassé, Parliament and the War Prerogative in the United Kingdom and Canada: Explaining
Variations in Institutional Change and Legislative Control, 70 PARL. AFF. 280, 289 (2017).
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Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action, BBC (Aug. 30, 2013),
https://perma.cc/TT2B-4R4N.
See Mills, supra note 106 at 5.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Julie Gainsburg et al., Argumentation and Decision Making in Professional Practice, 55 THEORY
INTO PRACTICE 332, 333 (2016) (asserting that “[a]ll professions have norms—tacit and explicit—
for what counts as a valid argument”). For the claim that normative arguments and persuasion are
increasingly important in international affairs, see Thomas Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action
in World Politics, 54 INT’L. ORG. 1 (2000); Darren Hawkins, Explaining Costly International Institutions:
Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms, 48 INT’L. STUD. Q. 779 (2004).
See generally CORNELL W. CLAYTON, GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY
AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS (1995).
See Nick Robinson, The Decline of the Lawyer Politician, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 657 (2017) (offering a recent
study that shows how the lawyer-politician trend has been significant, though declining in recent
years).
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influential participants in political debates.114 Thus, the same metrics that lawyers
use to analyze judicial precedents may end up spilling-over into discussions of
political precedents.115
Lastly, and perhaps most ambitiously, the structure of reasoning in law and
politics about precedents may essentially be the same. Consider an official facing
a claim that some past political event or decision is precedential and should
constrain her from making a contrary decision. How is she likely to proceed? Very
plausibly, she will adopt what we may term a common law-like approach,116 including
by interpreting the previous precedent using all kinds of sources that legal analysis
usually permits (including the reasons or justifications that underlie the precedent
and any written or verbal characterization that may shed light on it) and drawing
on the same tools that are familiar from common-law reasoning to “treat” a
pending case, such as extending it, distinguishing it, or “narrowing-it-down.”117
Though all this is quite abstract, there are in fact many illustrations of this
common-law like reasoning in real political dynamics.118 And it suggests that, like
other facets of legal argumentation, reasoning about precedents in common
law-like ways is not unique to legal institutions.119
***
For all these reasons, the analogy to judicial stare decisis does appear to
capture something meaningful about the operation of political stare decisis.
Authoritative and decisive political standoffs, decisions, or votes—which sharply
distribute between political winners and losers—may indeed become constraining
political precedents, just like legal judgments. And public officials in domestic and
114
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See, e.g., Amy Davidson Sorkin, What the Law Professors Brought to the Trump Impeachment Hearings, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/C9X7-358S. On the different role legal academics have in
different jurisdictions, see William Twining et al., The Role of Academics in the Legal System, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 920 (Mark Tushnet & Peter Cane eds., 2005).
For more on this, see infra Section IV.D.2.
See Tushnet, supra note 48, at 493–94 (suggesting this formulation). See also David A. Strauss,
Non-Judicial Precedent and the Removal Power, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (discussing the “ideology of the
common law” as existing also in relation to non-judicial precedents).
A useful survey of these “tools” can be found in Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent from Below, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1861 (2014). My view is that the most dramatic difference between common
law-like reasoning in politics and in law will probably exist in the type of sources that decision
makers would be allowed to draw on. For example, in politics the written “evidence” that decision
makers will rely on would be broader and might include written evidence or accounts from outside
observers of potentially precedential events. In law, the ability to draw on such outside evidence is
likely to be more limited.
For examples, see Philip Bobbit, The War Precedent, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 2, 2013),
https://perma.cc/EYC2-KCZN (showing how decision-makers think of past precedents in
common-law-like terms); N.W. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 82–85 (2010).
The use of analogies is another argumentative practice that can be found within and outside law.
See generally Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and Experience, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 249 (2017).
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international politics will draw on common law-like reasoning when deciding on
their meaning and import, especially when lawyers are involved, but not only then.

C. Why the Law Analogy Is Partial (At Best)
It would have made our lives easy if it were possible to model political stare
decisis entirely on law. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case. The legal
analogy is at best partial in the context of political stare decisis. At worst, it can
prove misleading. The basic problem is twofold. First, the analogy to law is not
sufficiently attentive to the sources from which precedential constraint in politics
stem, discussed in Section II.120 Second, the analogy ignores the crucial effects
some other conventional legal “craft” norms have on the practice of judicial stare
decisis, “craft” norms which politics would probably lack.
In the subsequent Sections of this Article, I therefore proceed to illustrate
this limitation of the analogy between political and judicial stare decisis and expose
how they indeed sharply differ from one another. In other words, I use judicial
stare decisis as a negative analogy to flesh out what is special about political stare
decisis and how exactly it operates. In Section IV, I focus on the stage of the initial
establishment of constraining precedents. In Section V, I address the overruling
stage. And in Section VI, I highlight how the involvement of the public in politics
creates further complications in thinking about political stare decisis the way we
think about judicial stare decisis.

IV. E STABLISHING P OLITIC AL P RE C E DE NTS
Political precedents can be established in ways that differ significantly from
judicial precedents. This Section shows why. Subsection A discusses the
emergence of political precedents beyond scenarios of winners and losers that
characterize judicial precedents. Subsection B shows that in politics winners and
losers can also have perverse results. Subsection C then argues that, unlike judicial
precedents that are created in “one go,” political precedents will most likely be
created with the passage of time, in a cumulative or retrospective way. Finally,
Subsection D suggests important qualifications to this claim.

A. Beyond Winners and Losers: Political Cooperation
Recall again the sources that Section II claimed can give rise to political stare
decisis. Given these sources, it is clear why situations in which politics resolves
decisively a “competitive and polarized” dispute, like in judicial judgments that
create judicial precedents, can have a constraining force. After all, losing is a
significant political penalty. And given how political norms often rely on the
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See supra Section II.A.
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existence of sanctions,121 significant losses may indeed signal the emergence or
existence of a political precedent that prohibits the attempted—now losing—
behavior. Moreover, an event that captures a decisive loss in politics, or a political
decision that rules against a certain course of action, may well be “identified” as a
constraining precedent by the operation of a second-order norm of political stare
decisis—because not accepting past losses might trigger institutional, professional,
or public impatience with those who haven’t made peace with their losses.
But winning and losing in politics is not all that matters. The existence of
political sanctions in the background of political events may be a sufficient condition
for the generation or identification of political precedents.122 Yet it is not a necessary
one. As Section II highlighted, political norms of the first-order can also stem
from cooperative arrangements that parties have a long-term interest in
maintaining, even without the existence of sanctions.123 As Section II further
emphasized, the existence of cooperative arrangements also matters for
environments characterized by the second-order norm of political stare decisis.124
Consequently, in thinking about the decisions and events that are likely to
generate political precedents, and hence constrain public officials in politics, we
need to go beyond the situations in which politics distributes decisively between
winners and losers—as in law—and look, too, for decisions or events that signal
political cooperation.
Of course, domestic and international politics will not always “announce”
the existence of these forms of cooperation in explicit terms. More likely, we will
see cases in which such cooperation will be indicated implicitly—in the practice of
political institutions themselves.125 That does not mean, however, that it is
impossible to identify cases of political cooperation in politics. Indeed, a large
strand of scholarship in the U.S. deals with the (mostly) tacit cooperative
“agreements” that seem to have arisen between the legislature and the executive
in myriad areas, including war powers,126 international diplomacy,127 and fiscal
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See Section II.C.1.
Though how much exactly is questionable, as we will see soon in Subsections B & C infra.
See Section II.C.1.
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Id.
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See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 434 (highlighting how in the inter-branch context there is
typically no “direct evidence of [inter-branch] agreement”). But see Adam Perry & Adam Tucker,
Top-Down Constitutional Conventions, 81 MODERN L. REV. 765 (2018) (discussing the existence of
explicit “agreements” that are deliberately meant to create constitutional norms or precedents).
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 465–66 (discussing OLC’s view that there is a “practical
understanding” between Congress and the presidency on some scope of unilateral war powers
authority).
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See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 539 (1999).
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matters.128 And it is not surprising that this scholarship observes that these kinds
of agreements have often had precedential force.129 For an additional example,
consider this: during the Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. considered invading Iraq even
absent the U.N. Security Council’s approval. Nonetheless, despite pressures from
some of its allies that urged it to act unilaterally and notwithstanding the fact that
it clearly had the ability to act unilaterally, the U.S. ended up choosing to cooperate
by awaiting the Security Council’s approval. This choice was later described as a
“galvanizing event”130 and as a political precedent for future cooperation in
international affairs through the Security Council.
In short, some events in politics might signal the existence of cooperative
agreements. And when this is the case, these events, like decisive political wins
and losses, may also generate constraining political precedents.

B. Overzealous Winners and Sore Losers
Another crucial difference between political and judicial stare decisis relates
to the nature of winning and losing itself. In law, winners generate legal precedents
about what is allowed as a legal matter, and losers generate precedents about what
is disallowed.131 In politics, this dynamic is often similar but not necessarily so. On
some occasions, it might matter how one wins or loses. Consider the following:
(*) The British Prime Minister enjoys broad patronage powers to appoint and
dismiss ministers. In 1962, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan decided to use
his broad power to fire no less than seven ministers from his cabinet at the
same time. This event—later known as “the night of the long knives”—was
seen as an unseemly use of the Prime Minister’s patronage, and some believe
that such use of that power will not be permitted today.132
(*) Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms allows the
central and provincial legislatures in Canada to temporarily override certain
portions of the Charter. As many have observed, however, resorting to the
use of Section 33 has atrophied133 or fallen into “desuetude”134 such that it is
very hard to resort to it again in practice. According to an influential account,
128
129
130

131

132

133
134

See Huq, supra note 73, at 1627–31.
See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 430.
Erik Voeten, The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force, 59
INT’L ORG. 527, 544–46 (2005).
For the importance, even obsession, of winning in courts in our system, see generally LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1994).
See Anthony King & Nicholas Allen, ‘Off with Their Heads’: British Prime Ministers and the Power to
Dismiss, 40 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 249 (2010).
See Vermeule, supra note 81, at 425.
Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 661
(2014).
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one of the reasons that led to this result is that its first use by the province of
Quebec was done in such a “sweeping and indiscriminate” way that it gave
the override power an aura of illegitimacy.135
(*) In international relations, some believe that a new rule that legitimizes what
is known as the “responsibility to protect” (or R2P) has begun to emerge.
However, the 2011 NATO operation in Libya is understood as a major blow
to R2P and to the “falling away”136 of the emerging consensus. And many
believe that this can be attributed to NATO’s intent to significantly exceed the
mandate of R2P in Libya—not only to protect civilians from oppressive
governments but also to exact regime change.137
In all these examples, the “winners” certainly prevailed in the specific
instance. Macmillan was able to dismiss his ministers, Quebec was able to override
the Canadian Charter, and NATO intervened in Libya. Nonetheless, given the
way these “wins” were achieved, they all have created precedents that seem to
have limited those same winners, or others similarly situated, in the future.
These examples expose a dynamic that we do not normally attribute to
judicial precedents. They illustrate that when political winners are overzealous, the
precedents they create may have perverse results. On a more strategic note, these
examples also suggest that credible and sympathetic political losers who can
portray their opponents as extraordinarily aggressive can take (at least some of)
the sting out of political wins and out of their own losses. A dramatic illustration
of this strategy comes from the well-known story of the Masada battle in the First
Jewish-Roman War (73–74 CE). As told by Flavius Josephus, the “pleasures of
victory” in Masada were ultimately denied to the Romans because, having
witnessed the communal suicide of 960 men, women, and children who were
blockading Masada in resistance to the Romans’ invasion, the Romans could “not
help but wonder at the courage displayed by the dead.”138
Credibility and sympathy in this context seem important, though, even if
they need not arise from a similarly morbid scenario as Masada. More specifically,
losers should beware not to become sore losers who might unintentionally
establish political precedents that strengthen their opponents and harm similarly
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Jeffery Goldsworthy, Judicial Review, Legislative Override, & Democracy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451,
468 (2003).
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As suggested, for example, by former Australian Former Minister Gareth Evans. See Gareth Evans, Fmr.
Australian Cabinet Minister, The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria, Address to Annual
Castan Centre for Human Rights Law Conference, Melbourne, (July 20, 2012),
https://perma.cc/9UK6-BQG2.
See, e.g., Jonathan Eyal, The Responsibility to Protect: A Chance Missed, in SHORT WAR, LONG SHADOW: THE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEGACIES OF THE 2011 LIBYA CAMPAIGN 53 (Adrian Johnson & Saqeb Mueen
eds., 2012).
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positioned future losers.139 As an example of the real risk sore losers in politics
face, consider that Theodore Roosevelt’s decision in 1911 to split from the
Republican Party and to run on a third-party ticket after he had lost the Republican
nomination ultimately led many states to introduce laws that prohibit such a move.
These laws are even known as “sore loser” laws.140

C. The Challenge of Establishing Political Precedents
The issues discussed in Subsections A and B might be addressed by
“qualifying” the analogy between political stare decisis and judicial stare decisis—
recognizing the potential precedential force of events that signal political
cooperation (Subsection A) and acknowledging the occasional perverse effects of
winning and losing (Subsection B). Here, I discuss a more fundamental issue—
namely, that there is a systematic difference between how political precedents and
judicial precedents are likely to emerge. I develop the argument in two steps.

1. Judicial and political precedents: an unequal informational burden
First, precedents in law and politics both must serve an extremely basic
function. That function is informational in nature. To be established, both judicial
and political precedents need to convey to those who will later seek to adhere to
them the information needed to illustrate their precedential nature.
But the informational burden imposed on political and judicial precedents is
dramatically different. In law, the informational burden is relatively light; in
politics, it is relatively heavy. Partly, this is because law is formalized and mostly
written down, whereas in politics this is not necessarily (or even usually) the case.
Indeed, it is much easier to track legal judgments than, say, implicit cooperative
arrangements in politics.141 But what makes the informational burden diverge is
also, and crucially, the existence of the following two “craft” norms that apply to
the context of judicial stare decisis. The primary effect of these craft norms is to
limit the information that lawyers and judges need to acquire before they classify
a decision as precedential and hence constraining.
139

140

141

A related concern of sore losers is that they develop a “siege mentality” or enter a “spiral of silence”
that causes them to retreat from politics altogether. See Daniel Bar-Tal & Dikla Antebi, Beliefs About
Negative Intentions of the World: A Study of the Israeli Siege Mentality, 13 POL. PSYCH. 633, 642–43 (1992)
(explaining “siege mentality” as a group mental state in which the group believes that out-groups
have negative intentions towards them and can lead to increased sensitivity, greater group cohesion
and drastic measures to avoid danger); Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of
Public Opinion, 24 J. PUB. COM. 43 (1974).
For scholarly treatment of these laws, see generally Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and Democratic
Contestation, 99 GEO L.J. 1013 (2011). And, at least on one account, as of August 2014, all but three
states in the U.S. (Connecticut, Iowa, and New York) had these sore loser laws. See Barry C. Burden
et al., Sore Loser Laws and Congressional Polarization, 39 LEG. STUD. Q. 299, 305 (2014).
See also Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 112–13 (identifying “discoverability” as a condition for the
generation of non-judicial precedents).
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The first craft norm is that judicial precedents come “neatly packaged” 142
and are set in “one go”143 or as a “one-off.”144 As some have put it, in law, “[i]t
only takes one case to lock in a resolution.”145
A second relevant craft norm is that to determine the precedential value of
judicial decisions, judges and lawyers need not inquire into the psychology behind
a judge’s vote. Indeed, the fact that, say, the “swing” or “pivotal” judge on a panel
in a domestic or international court146 concurs half-heartedly or the fact that that
this judge was potentially insincere about the reasons that led her to vote are not
probative of the judgment’s precedential force. A judge in a future case, and
according to accepted legal craft norms, cannot simply disregard a previous
judicial decision that garnered enough votes just because she is skeptical of the
“true” beliefs or motives of one of the voting judges or of his or her insincerity. 147
Half-heartedly produced judicial precedents are still valid precedents.
Things are different in politics. Even if politics has been professionalized to
a substantial extent, as discussed above,148 it is unlikely that it will be characterized
by the exact identical “craft” norms as exist in law. Rather, public officials will not
be restricted, as judges and lawyers are, to examine exclusively what appears to be
a “neatly packaged” event or restricted in asking after that event has concluded,
“What comes next?” And public officials will not be similarly restricted from
questioning what the people involved in the event were truly thinking during the
relevant event or what motivated them to behave as they did.
And here lies a crucial twist: It is not only that politics will probably not limit
such inquiries about the nature of supposedly precedential events in politics; these
sorts of inquiries will very likely be called for as part of the process of generating political
precedents and the emergence of precedential constraint.
142
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Schauer, supra note 3, at 573.
Baude, supra note 13, at 39.
David S. Schwartz, Madison’s Waiver: Can Constitutional Liquidation Be Liquidated?, 72 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 17, 20 (2019).
Joseph Blocher & Margaret H. Lemos, Practice and Precedent in Historical Gloss Games, 105 GEO L.J.
ONLINE 1, 10 (2016). Of course, this hasn’t always been the case. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 13, at
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For the role of pivotal and swing judges in international courts, see Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of
International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 426
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craft norm later. See infra notes 257–66 and accompanying text.
See generally Black, supra note 77 (explaining sets of values defining what it means to be professional
in politics); Asher, supra note 79 (describing how freshmen congressmen learn professional norms).
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To see this, recall again the sources from which political stare decisis
originates discussed in Section II. The first source is when events indicate the
emergence or existence of first-order political norms. But to determine whether
an event in politics is in fact indicative in this way—asking “What comes next?”
after the political event has transpired and “What made the involved parties
behave as they did?”—is crucial. Political norms exist precisely because in some
important sense, public officials have internalized beliefs about what ought to be
done in politics. And without inquiring into the nature of the beliefs underlying
the behavior and the degree to which future public officials are willing to adhere
to what happened previously (or how other relevant actors will react if they fail to
repeat that behavior), it would be impossible to understand whether an event in
politics indicates the emergence or existence of a political norm that political
decision makers may be reluctant to upset.
An identical inquiry will similarly occur even when the constraining force of
the past stems from its additional political source—the norm of political stare
decisis. True, in principle, this norm constrains even when events do not
themselves indicate the existence or emergence of political norms of the
first-order.149 But when a public official in an environment where the norm of
political stare decisis exerts force considers whether to identify an event as a
constraining political precedent, she is likely to be very much aware of the
consequences of doing so. And if she perceives these consequences as costly, this
official will ultimately ask whether the past event should be understood as
constraining in a more significant way. In effect, a decision maker who is
compelled by the norm of political stare decisis will end up asking the same
questions that a decision maker who is not compelled by that norm would ask.
And that again goes to the actual beliefs and motivations of those involved in the
event and to the issue of, “What comes next?”
The upshot, then, is that the informational burdens that precedents face in
law and in politics are significantly unequal. Judicial precedents will be established
and hence constrain relatively easily—in “one go”—given that there is no need to
inquire into the actual beliefs or motives of the presiding judges or into the future
to identify a judicial decision as precedential. Conventional legal craft norms in
fact forbid lawyers and judges from doing so. By contrast, political precedents will
be generated after a much more labored process of inquiry and speculation into
the nature of the supposedly precedential event. The informational burden on
them is, thus, much heavier. More concretely, a political precedent will be
generated and hence constrain only when decision makers become sufficiently
convinced that, given the actual beliefs and motivations of those involved in the
relevant political event and given the prospects of behaviors and reactions, what
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has transpired truly indicates the emergence or existence of a political norm that
they would be reluctant to upset.150

2. The difficulty of living up to the informational burden in politics
But how likely is it that political events or decisions will meet this high
informational burden? True, we have seen in Section II that political events and
decisions might in principle “signal” the generation of political norms of the
first-order or confirm their existence.151 At this point, though, it is important to
recognize that the ability of political decisions or events to fulfill this function by
themselves and at the moment of their occurrence is systematically low.152 Indeed,
even decisive political wins or losses and “galvanizing events” that signal political
cooperation will not necessarily generate or become identified as precedential
shortly after they have transpired.
In part, this is because no one is a fortune teller or a mind reader. But in part,
and more interestingly, this is also because political events and decisions are not
like a slap on the face. They are much more ambiguous about what they convey.153
There are three types of political ambiguities that I will highlight here that
systematically decrease the likelihood of political decisions or events to live up to
the informational burden necessary to establish a constraining political precedent
at the moment of their occurrence.
a) The indecisiveness of single political events
The first type of ambiguity has to do with the nature of single political events
or decisions. As previously discussed, a political event that captures a decisive
political loss by vote, decision, or standoff may serve as an important
informational signal that a political precedent has been generated.154 But in
politics, single political events are rarely truly decisive by themselves.
Indeed, the fact that political losers lost one time does not mean that they
have decided to forgo trying to win again. Consider some of the examples
discussed in Section III. FDR won a third and then fourth term in office contrary
to a widespread belief that U.S. presidents cannot serve more than two terms. But
ultimately, the Twenty-Second Amendment was introduced and then ratified,
150
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Another way to put this point is that judicial precedents are what literature in psychology describes
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See supra Section II.C.2.
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About the Beliefs of the Public, 40 PUB. OP. Q. 427, 427 (1976).
See supra Section III.B.2.
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which operated to neutralize FDR’s achievement and restored the limit to two
presidential terms.155 Or consider British parliamentary involvement in military
affairs. The British government lost the vote in Parliament on military
involvement in Syria, and that in turn generated expectations that Parliament
should be involved in such matters going forward. But relatively soon after this
loss, the government insisted that the vote should be understood narrowly and
that there remain military affairs in which the government would continue to
operate unilaterally.156 The losers in these examples have, in some important sense,
recuperated.
From a different angle, the fact that winners in politics have won once does
not mean that those wins will be omnipresent or that the winners will necessarily
be victorious again. What if the win was merely lucky or exceptional? And what if
it otherwise did not attest to the reality of the winners’ political strengths?157 Recall
that French President de Gaulle’s 1962 referendum proved successful, and
changes to the French Constitution were accepted despite widespread
understanding at the time that the Constitution could not be amended through
referendum.158 But in 1969, de Gaulle initiated another referendum on a different
matter and ultimately lost. And that loss was later understood, plausibly, as
neutralizing the earlier precedent.159
Sophisticated political observers and participants are obviously aware of this
ambiguous nature of single wins or losses. Drawing on a military analogy, they
know that some political victories that appear decisive may in fact be only tactical
or operational wins—they have won the battle but not the war.160 Consequently,
political decision makers will be very cautious about taking such events as
precedential and constraining in “one go,” as would be conventional to do for a
legal decisionmaker. Rather, the political decision maker will wait to see whether
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the political battle is truly decisive—whether the losers are fully, as Carl von
Clausewitz famously put it, “incapable of further resistance.”161
The same problem regarding the imperfect informational signal of single
political events applies with similar force to the other scenario from which a
political constraint may arise—the scenario of political cooperation. After all, even
if public officials have cooperated in one instance, it is far from clear that this
cooperation will recur in future interactions. Indeed, it is quite possible that the
other side might benefit from a different kind of cooperative arrangement162 or
even from not cooperating at all.163 To draw on an example mentioned
previously,164 the fact that the U.S. chose to rely on the Security Council during
the Gulf War might have been a galvanizing event regarding the functioning of
the Security Council as a cooperative arrangement in matters of international use
of force. But not too long after the war had concluded, the U.S. often proceeded
unilaterally in ways that suggested that the cooperative advantages it drew from
the Security Council were limited at best.165
Again, sophisticated political observers and participants are aware of the
potential fragility of a single-shot cooperative event. They know that in politics,
the Oracle in the Matrix movie series was correct: the “real test for any choice is
having to make that choice again.”166
Note another important issue that emphasizes how single political events or
decisions in politics have low informational quality and cannot normally by
themselves generate a political precedent in “one go.” In law, part of what
strengthens the craft norm that judicial precedents are created immediately relates
to institutional features of the judiciary. Given that judicial institutions are mostly
passive, often have limited and even discretionary dockets, and can entertain
161
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various evasive strategies,167 the pace with which similar matters come before
courts again for reconsideration is relatively slow—in some cases, extremely
slow.168 Accordingly, even if we were to suspect that a certain judicial precedent
might be overruled if reconsidered, that “if” is potentially significant. By contrast,
political institutions regularly lack these features. They do not necessarily have
slow “jurisprudential cycles” like courts.169 Worrying about what comes next in
politics and the fulfillment of what can be thought of as the Carl von
Clausewitz/Matrix tests are therefore pressing issues, even immediately after the
event has transpired.
b) Observational Equivalence
Another source of ambiguity in politics that systematically decreases the
chances of establishing political precedents in “one go” and at the moment of
occurrence is that there is often serious uncertainty about what motivates those
involved in generating those precedents. This relates to the well-known issue of
“observational equivalence,” according to which a certain observed behavior can
be explained by different causal theories at the same time. 170 What observational
equivalence highlights here is that it is often difficult to confidently identify that a
political behavior in a particular event or decision, and even in a series of events
and decisions, can be explained by something that truly indicates the emergence
or existence of a political norm.
We can further divide the challenge stemming from observational
equivalence in the generation of political precedents into two typical scenarios.
The first scenario occurs when there are multiple valid explanations that can account
for the event or decision. Consider again the political resolution by voting which,
as we saw,171 might settle political disputes in ways that give rise to political
precedents. But on further reflection, can votes really do so on their own? For
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See supra Section III.B.2.
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instance, when FDR was voted in for a third and then a fourth term, did that
suggest that voters at the time believed that the tradition prohibiting more than
two terms had become obsolete in general? Or just in the specific circumstances
at hand? Did the voters have that tradition in mind, or were they only voting to
express their support of FDR? Indeed, the act of voting is notoriously difficult to
interpret.172 There are numerous explanations for the vote, and not all align with
the conclusion that the emergence of a political norm brought about its result.173
The other scenario where observational equivalence proves important
occurs when the relevant political event or decision has a dominant alternative
explanation that does not coincide with understanding the event as indicating the
emergence or existence of a constraining precedent.
Two potential dominant-but-disruptive explanations seem especially likely
in politics. The first is adherence to law.174 For instance, it was suggested that it is
impossible to view the behaviors associated with filibuster use in the U.S. Senate
as creating what is akin to political precedents about that practice.175 On this view,
because the U.S. Constitution grants unlimited discretion to the Senate to change
the filibuster, merely observing the relevant changes around it has no
determinative informational value as to the existence of norms around this
practice. The relevant players might simply be motivated by the fact that the law
enables them to behave as they do; they are not bound to the practice in any other
way.176
The second frequent explanation that can have disruptive implications is
self-interested behavior. Indeed, self-interest in politics is highly correlated with
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See Elster, supra note 48, at 46–47; GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 138–39 (highlighting the ambiguity of the
voting procedure).
Note that similar issues beset political cooperative agreements. As discussed in Section IV.A, many
of these agreements are created tacitly, through practice and political events themselves.
Consequently, we are often able to interpret them in multiple ways. For instance, perhaps the
agreement is just a matter of convenience, and the parties have no long-term interest in sticking to
it. If the agreement was achieved in silence, maybe it was not an agreement at all. See, e.g., Bradley
& Morrison, supra note 13, at 448. Maybe the involved political institutions did not even consider
the event as signaling an agreement, but it was in fact created in an accidental or spontaneous way.
See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 13, at 686–88. And maybe it was just a matter of casual habit rather
than deep commitment. On the difference between norms and habits, see, e.g., Joseph Jaconelli,
Do Constitutional Conventions Bind?, 64 CAMB. L.J. 149, 150 (2005).
Cf. Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition,
in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 74–75 (Matthew Adler & Kenneth
Einar Himma eds., 2009) (assessing the interaction between written constitution and
extraconstitutional customary law and asserting that the existence of a written constitution can
crowd out some customs).
See Richard Albert, How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitutions, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 387,
399 (2015).
See id.
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negative conclusions about the existence of political precedents. Consider the
following:
(*) The person who fills the role of the German chancellor is always selected
from the largest party in the coalition. Accordingly, some have suggested that
this practice constitutes a constraining political precedent. But others have
powerfully argued that what drives the choice about who becomes the
chancellor is often the interests of the negotiating parties that form the
coalition. Therefore, no political precedent can be said to exist.177
(*) Many believe that a political precedent instructs the U.K. House of Lords
not to intervene in financial legislation that the House of Commons passes.
But some have argued against this view that because the House of Commons
safeguards its powers against the House of Lords only when it is politically
convenient for it to do so, the political precedent is more imaginary than
real.178
c) Deliberate ambiguity: negating and self-negating statements
A final source of ambiguity that systematically hampers the generation of
political precedents worth highlighting is deliberate in nature. I have previously
alluded to the possibility that political institutions and decision makers are aware
that their conduct could sow the seeds of political precedents.179 What we can now
add is that being aware of this possibility, political decision makers may therefore
have good reasons to purposefully obfuscate the precedential potential of the
event.
We can distinguish between two different types of such deliberate
obfuscation that we are likely to observe in real political dynamics. One type is
when the political institution or decision maker actively tries to prevent the
precedential effect because they know that it will be contrary to their interests. In
these cases, the decision maker will simply accompany her behavior with a negating
statement that seeks to deny the precedential effects of that behavior. For example,
when the Canadian government agreed to hold a parliamentary vote before
approving future military deployments to Afghanistan, the government
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See Greg Taylor, Convention by Consensus: Constitutional Conventions in Germany, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L.
303, 328 (2014). See also Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President:
Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 576 (1999) (arguing that
the practice against more than two presidential terms was not in fact a norm given the self-interested
behavior of U.S. presidents throughout time).
Specifically, the House of Commons interferes in decisions by the House of Lords only in the context of budget
cuts rather than with increases. See Robert B. Taylor, The House of Lords and Constitutional Conventions: The Case for
Legislative Reform, U.K. CONST’L L. BLOG (Nov. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/6T5G-6Y8L.
See supra text accompanying note 85.
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announced that whatever the results of the vote, it should not be understood to
be a precedent limiting its unilateral executive powers.180
Another option, though, is that the party that tries to obfuscate the
precedential effects of a political event or decision is in fact the one who might benefit
from these effects. At first, this situation might seem counterintuitive. But it has
real bite. Sometimes the ability to “get” something in politics might be conditioned
on such obfuscation, either because the side who will be benefitting is in a
relatively weak position (and the stronger side insists on it) or simply because the
beneficiary is uncertain how the thing it is “getting” will eventually be perceived
(either by other political elites or, as we will see later, the public).181 In such a case,
the political technique would be to accompany the event with self-negating
statements.182

3. Summing up: the retrospective & cumulative nature of political
precedents
In sum, despite initial similarities, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
political stare decisis is likely to operate in vastly different ways from its judicial
counterpart. First, given the lack of similar craft norms, events and decisions in
politics will face a much more significant informational burden before they can
emerge as political precedents. That burden relates to these decisions or events
being able to signal or serve as “proof” for the emergence or existence of political
norms of the first-order. This involves questions about the true beliefs and
motivations of those involved in the event as well as about “What comes next.”
Law restricts the ability of judges and lawyers to address these issues. By contrast,
in politics, much of the “action” will be exactly there, probably more so than will
any common law-like reasoning.
Second, because the ability of events or decisions in politics to face up to
this informational burden at the time of their occurrence is systematically low (in
light of politics’ deliberate and non-deliberate ambiguities discussed above), it is
likely that contrary to judicial precedents that are established in “one go,” political
precedents will be generated, or become identified as such, if at all, only after the
event or decision. More concretely, decisions and events in politics will establish
constraining political precedents retrospectively—when sufficient evidence has been
gathered that confirms that the event indicated the emergence or contemporary
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See Philippe Lagassé, Parliament and the War Prerogative in the United Kingdom and Canada: Explaining
Variations in Institutional Change and Legislative Control, PARL. AFF. 1, 13 (2016).
See Section V.
For discussion of a good example of this dynamic in real constitutional politics, see Elster, supra
note 48, at 47–48.
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existence of a political norm that decision makers would not wish to upset.183
Alternatively, political precedents will emerge in a cumulative fashion, after they
have been followed again184 and in a pattern of gradual affirmation.185

D. Qualifications: Easily Established Political Precedents
The argument above needs to be importantly qualified. On occasion,
precedents in politics can be generated or identified more easily than what
Subsection C has suggested. In some cases, political precedents might even
emerge very quickly, in much the same way we understand judicial precedents to
emerge in “one go.”

1. Meeting the informational burden
I have described above the various ways in which politics can be ambiguous
and thus why political events and decisions—by themselves and in the moment
they occur—will likely fail to convey the information from which observers can
confidently conclude the existence or emergence of political precedents. But not
all political events are equal in this sense.
For one, though we now know that even the most decisive events in which
politics resolves a “competitive and polarized” dispute by a vote, decision, or the
winding down of a political standoff and even those “galvanizing events” that
vividly demonstrate the existence of political cooperation between political
institutions or officials are, in important respects, ambiguous about whether they
reflect the emergence or existence of a political norm. Yet, there is no doubt that
such events may serve as a relatively strong indication of that possibility. They are
certainly more powerful candidates for becoming political precedents than, for
example, events that at the time they occurred did not present a “competitive and
polarized” dispute in the first place or were not resolved decisively and that only
in hindsight we have come to see them as such.
In addition, sometimes events in politics will occur in circumstances that can
amplify their informational value. Consequently, the likelihood that they will be
taken as constraining political precedents and the pace with which this occurs will
quicken. For instance, we have seen before the ambiguities associated with voting
procedures and why votes may be a low value signal for the emergence of political
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Theories that give weight to historical practice in constitutional law also recognize this. See, e.g.,
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 415; Baude, supra note 13, at 16–18.
This possibility is similarly recognized in the literature on the role of historical practice in
constitutional law. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 435; GERHARDT, supra note 15, at
113.
I adapt this term from Barry Friedman, Things Forgotten in the Debate Over Judicial Independence, 14 GA.
ST. L. REV. 737, 760 (1998).
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norms and thus likely not precedential as such.186 Yet some voting procedures
produce much less ambiguous conclusions about a vote’s meaning; referenda,
which detail a much more precise question for an up/down vote, are the most
obvious example.187
We have also seen that opportunistic political behavior can obfuscate the
ability to conclude from that behavior that what explains it is a political norm, and
hence that the event will be taken as precedential.188 But while self-interested
behavior is pervasive in politics, political institutions and decision makers
occasionally behave in what seem like non-opportunistic ways—for example, by
incurring personal or institutional costs or exemplifying bipartisanship. 189 And
when this occurs, the events or decisions’ informational value increases. Consider,
for instance, how the following precedents that political observers have identified
are or were partially reliant on strong political precedents of this kind:
(1) The nineteenth century precedent that prohibited U.S. presidents from
leaving the country while in office: some presidents took this restriction so
seriously that when meeting their Mexican counterparts, they had to do so
halfway across a bridge over the Rio Grande (a serious hassle at the time).190
(2) The precedent against more than two presidential terms (well before
FDR’s successful election to third and fourth terms in office): in 1896, the
Democratic Party decided to deny the nomination to President Grover
Cleveland—who was concluding two terms in office—even though at the
time he was likely the party’s best nominee.191
(3) The precedent that the German chair of the Budget Committee in the
Bundestag should be filled by the largest party in the opposition: in 2013, a
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See supra Section IV.C.2.
For more reading on the latest attempts to fashion “best practices” of how to conduct referendums, and
the importance of clarity of the questions being put up to a vote, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE ON REFERENDUMS,
(Oct. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/PC3H-E73F (highlighting that “[t]he clarity of the question is a
crucial aspect of the voters’ freedom to form an opinion.”).
See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 170 and accompanying text (explaining the problem of observational
equivalence whereby a behavior can be explained by multiple causes).
The qualification “seems like” is necessary because sometimes limiting one’s discretion against
apparent self-interest may be conducive to the relevant agent across other dimensions of their
activity or in the medium run. See generally, e.g., Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865 (2007) (suggesting mechanisms by which a well-motivated executive can
signal to voters their good intentions by limiting their own discretion for the public good, such as
by making bipartisan appointments and choosing policies counter to the preferences of their own
party).
See H.W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 201–03 (1925).
See Jon Elster, Political Norms, 63 IYYUN: J PHIL Q. 47, 58 (2014). But see Jaconelli, supra note 173, at
157 n.27 (recounting how the electorate chose to “acquiesce” when FDR broke the two-term
precedent).
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representative of the Left Party, at the time the only opposition party, was given
the position despite being “on the fringe of German politics” and “the unease
[that] was expressed at the time.”192
Finally, we have also seen that actors can deliberately make political events or
decisions ambiguous when they accompany political events or decisions with
negating or self-negating statements.193 But here too there are limits. First, there is
a cap on what words can do on their own. Decision makers in politics can employ
negating and self-negating statements as much as they want, but at some point, if
they behave contrary to their statements, these statements will stop being credible
and will lose their precedent-denying force.194 Consider the practice around
peacetime espionage in international law. States have repeatedly denied that there
is an exception in international law for espionage and other intelligence activities
and continue to do so today.195 They resort, in the terms I have used here, to
“negating statements.”196 Nonetheless, there is no doubt that states do in fact
engage in espionage during peacetime and have consistently done so.197 As a result,
claims that there is no exception for espionage in international law seem to have
lost their credibility.198
Moreover, and more interestingly perhaps, in politics, sometimes the mirror
image of negating and self-negating can also occur—when we encounter what
could be described as self-confirming statements, in which those involved in the event
confirm the precedential status of events. For example, when the norm against
192
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See Taylor, supra note 177, at 315.
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1000 (2008);
Elster, supra note 48, at 47–48. See also supra text accompanying notes 179–86.
See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 193, at 1000 (“Branches cannot avoid creating precedents just by
using magic words. Other actors will adjust their behavior based on their best estimates of how the branch
behaves.”).
Summary Record 1845th Meeting, [1984] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 185–86, U.N. Doc. A/ CN.4/SR.1845
(stating that, in relation to peacetime espionage, “everyone engaged in that exercise, but everyone
denied it”).
Alexandra H. Perina, Black Holes and Open Secrets: The Impact of Covert Action on International Law, 53
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 507, 542 (2015) (stating that “[h]istorically, governments were loath even
to acknowledge that they engaged in covert activity, especially in peacetime”)
See generally, Iñaki Navarrete & Russell Buchan, Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage,
International Law, and the Existence of Customary Exceptions, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 897 (2019).
See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 291, 305
(2015):
[T]he widespread and long-standing practice of spying—committed by many
states in different regions of the world during time periods that both precede
and post-date the UN Charter—undercuts arguments that these customary
principles either were intended to prohibit espionage at the time they developed
or should be deemed to do so today.
But see Navarrete & Buchan, supra note 197, at 901 (disputing the claim that customary international
law recognizes peacetime espionage).
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looting arts after wars was emerging in international relations, one of its most
vocal opponents stated that he had a change of heart, writing that “perhaps the
monuments of arts should never have entered the domain of conquest.” 199 That
statement might have had a self-confirming effect, contributing to the
crystallization of the norm.
In sum, while the burden cast on political precedents is substantial, it may
not be completely impossible to fulfill it. Some events or decisions are more likely
to face the burden than others.

2. Standardizing politics (and its precedents)
In Subsection C, I argued that it is unlikely that politics will feature the exact
same “craft” norms that exist in law that prevent judges and lawyers from
inquiring into the judges’ motives and beliefs or into the “what comes next”
question. This in turn highlighted the challenge of establishing political precedents
and why they are unlikely to arise in “one go.” But what if political decision makers
did have some standardization of the way they should identify political
precedents? After all, as I mentioned before, politics has been professionalized to
a certain extent.200 And as I further mentioned, lawyers have a significant influence
on politics, from inside and outside political institutions.201 Thus, it would not be
surprising to see some attempt to standardize what goes into the task of
identifying political precedents. And to the extent that this would occur, its effect
will be to ease the way in which political precedents are identified.
To make this less abstract, let me highlight two concrete examples of exactly
such attempts to standardize politics and the task of identifying political
precedents. The first example is found in customary international law. Indeed, one
of the crucial tasks practitioners in this field face is identifying political precedents
of a particular kind—ones that indicate the existence or emergence of a norm of
customary international law. In principle, to know which events in international
politics constitute customary international norms, practitioners need to inquire
into the same issues that other political decision makers need to inquire into when
determining whether an event is a precedent and indicates political norms’
emergence or existence, which is the motives and beliefs of those involved and
“What comes next?” In fact, in customary international law, the threshold may be
even higher than it is in other political contexts because for a customary norm to
emerge, the level of internalization of the relevant state practice is usually
understood to be especially high. Specifically, the practice should reflect opinio juris,
199
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See Wayne Sandholtz, Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules Against Wartime Plunder, 14 EUR. J.
INT’L. L. 101, 114 (2008).
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See CLAYTON, supra note 112; Robinson, supra note 113; Sorkin, supra note 114. See also supra text
accompanying notes 112–16.
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which is to say it needs to be accepted by states as if it were binding law. Nonetheless,
within the international community there are ongoing efforts to “standardize” this
inquiry by, for instance, identifying what sources are especially indicative of the
intentions and beliefs of states about the emergence of customary norms.202
The second example is found in discussions in American constitutional law
about the role of historical practice in “constructing,”203 providing “gloss,”204 or
“liquidating”205 the Constitution’s text. Here too the claim made by scholars who
believe that past practice can inform constitutional interpretation is often about
the precedential effect of past events in constitutional politics, which, to many,206
requires looking more seriously into the beliefs and motives of the political
institutions and asking “What comes next?” And here, too, what those engaged in
this enterprise attempt to do is to give guidance and “standardize” the task of
identifying which acts are valid political precedents that may inform constitutional
interpretation.207
Both examples supply some motivation for the idea that politics and its
precedents can be standardized and thus the process of identifying or generating
political precedents can be eased. Yet these examples also point to the limits of
that possibility. First, both examples are obviously drawn from contexts where the
interaction between law and politics is significant because of the involvement of
lawyers and courts. It is an open question whether we would see similar attempts
to standardize politics without similar overlap.208 Second, though it is clear there
is an attempt at standardization in both these examples, the attempts are clearly
incomplete. Many disputes remain inside each of these fields, and no consensus
seems to include insight into what exactly the proper standardization is.209
202
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See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission, 142–51 U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018).
See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 13.
See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13.
See Baude, supra note 13.
This qualification is necessary because on some accounts of the constitutional pedigree of historical
practice, it can provide “gloss” also for mere “Burkean” reasons, which do not require any level of
internalization of the practice. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 455–56.
See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 77–79 (2013)
(highlighting this standardizing task of the literature and critiquing it).
See also infra Section V.A. I note that even Professor Gerhardt’s discussion of “non-judicial
precedents” seems to assume the possibility of some form of legal regulation. See generally
GERHARDT, supra note 15.
Indeed, in customary international law, the recommendations by the International Law
Commission, cited supra note 202, are still in draft form. In constitutional law, the judicial doctrine
is far from coherent, and scholars dispute the circumstances of when exactly the past should be
considered as providing meaningful guidance for constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L.
REV. 1 (2020) (comparing a “historical gloss” method of constitutional interpretation to
“liquidation”).
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The promise of standardization therefore exists but is likely modest at best.

3. Quick political precedents
I arrive finally at the most substantial qualification: in some cases, political
precedents will be generated or become identified as such quickly and even
immediately, very much like how we think of judicial precedents.
a) Low political stakes
An important assumption implicitly built into the discussion in the preceding
Subsection, and that led to the conclusion that political precedents are likely
retrospective or cumulative rather than arising in “one go,” was that the matters
at hand were consequential and involved high stakes for the relevant decision
makers. It was clear, for instance, who exactly would lose and who would win if
the precedent would be taken as such. Alternatively, it was clear that some political
institutions benefit more than others from the existence of a particular
cooperative arrangement (for instance, consider the benefits non-superpower
states draw from the arrangement of cooperating on war-related matters through
the Security Council compared to those the U.S. draws from such cooperation).210
But not all political events carry similarly consequential lessons. Or, perhaps
more accurately, the mere chance that some rule of conduct suggested by a
political event will prove consequential in the future does not mean that it was
considered consequential at the time it originally occurred. To the contrary, decision
makers in politics might not have foreseen how some past events would prove to
be binding and consequential for them down the road. It might not even matter
if the decision makers saw the potential costs of being bound by an event or if
adhering to the rule of conduct suggested by the precedent is far from their own
point of view (as they would have preferred a different kind of precedent).
Sometimes, the future for political decision makers will seem too far off and
uncertain to prompt decision makers to question the precedential weight of past
events or decisions.211 And sometimes decision makers may prefer a “settlement”
precisely because the stakes of getting something right might be, at that exact
moment, low.212
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See Voeten, supra note 130. See also supra text accompanying note 165.
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In technical terms, this is often referred to as low “discount rates.” See ROBERT E. GOODIN,
POLITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 162–83 (1982).
See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design, 9
INT’L. J. CONST. L. 636, 643–46 (2011) (explaining that, for some decisions in constitution drafting,
it is more important that actors be coordinated through a decision than that that decision be exactly
right); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 906–11
(1996) (arguing that conventionalism—the idea that it is more important for some things to be
settled than right—is a part of the common law tradition that explains constitutional interpretation
today).
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The original perception of the stakes of the rules of conduct suggested by
political events is important. When the stakes are viewed initially as low, political
precedents will be generated quite quickly after the event has transpired, as if at
first blush.
I have described the issue informally, but we can connect it to the two
sources of past precedential constraint in politics. Events that indicate rules of
conduct that are not consequential in this sense can signal the existence or
emergence of what the literature refers to as “coordination norms,” which are
norms that are adhered to because no one has a strong enough interest to defect
from them, and everyone prefers to work in tandem.213 They are often merely
“focal points,”214 much like whether we drive on the right or left.
In addition, when an event points to a low-stakes political arrangement, it
will be quickly identified as a political precedent by the second-order norm of
political stare decisis. In such circumstances, political decision makers will not
need to question the precedential nature of the event because the stakes will seem
not sufficiently high to justify that effort. And the cooperative advantages they
gain from adhering to the norm of political stare decisis or the institutional,
professional, or public pressures to adhere to that norm will easily dominate.
b) High(er) political stakes
But can political precedents emerge or be identified relatively quickly even if
the stakes of politics are higher?
Of course, decision makers in politics may have attributes that make them
particularly amenable to conform to past political decisions or lessons learnt by
past events, even if this would substantially work against their interests. We have
seen before that political institutions and decision makers may be risk-averse or
lack imagination.215 They may have an increased, even exaggerated, tendency to
conform.216 But what of political decision makers (or institutions) who are
savvier—who are, in other words, less in the model of H.L.A. Hart’s “puzzled
213

See Vermeule, supra note 48, at 1186 (describing “thin” obligations as those an actor follows because,
given others’ behavior, breaching it harms the actor more than it would benefit them). See generally
DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969). Of course, there is a difference
between pure coordination and other forms of coordination games. See generally McAdams, supra
note 56 (capturing this difference by emphasizing that precedents can be generated or become
identified, even if the solution is not ideal from the point of view of one of the parties).
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THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–67 (1960) (describing how behavioral
coordination benefits from focal points or known expectations about how others will behave or be
expected to behave).
See Vertzberger, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
To motivate this claim, it is worth noting that social science literature has identified that certain
groups of people tend to develop a sense of “false consensus” more easily than others, meaning
that they overestimate their similarity to others within their group. See generally, Chadly Stern, Tessa
V. West & Peter G. Schmitt, The Liberal Illusion of Uniqueness, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 137 (2014).
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person”217 and more in that of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “bad man”?218 Can such
decision makers also abide by political events and immediately take them as
precedential, even if that would mean behaving in ways that they believe would
be wrong or operate against their interests?219
I believe that there are three main possibilities where this can indeed occur.
The first is when a high-stakes decision or event will be taken as a constraining
political precedent by an influential figure—or “opinion leader”—and others
simply follow that precedent because of powerful cascade effects.220
A second possibility is when a precedential event either (1) instantly creates
a political norm of the first-order or (2) generates widespread but false beliefs
about the immediate emergence of a political norm subsequent to the event. Both
scenarios can arise under conditions of pluralistic ignorance, in which people are
uncertain of others’ preferences or beliefs and thus end up falsifying or making
invisible their own preferences and beliefs.221 In the first scenario, political
decision makers, prior to the precedential event, believed that a certain political
path was more desirable, but disguised or obfuscated those beliefs because they
suspected that others saw things differently, even though they did not. The event
that supports the decision makers’ true beliefs then “unleashes”222 and crystalizes
the political norm.223 In the second scenario, the power of pluralistic ignorance
kicks in after the event has transpired, when decision makers believe that others
have understood the event to be precedential and indicative of the emergence of
a political norm, whereas other decision makers believe, falsely, the same.
While possible, these scenarios are probably rather rare (particularly the latter
one, which seems plausible mostly in authoritarian regimes).224 A final possibility
217
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H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40 (3rd ed. 2012).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
I note that enhanced conformity can sometimes be strategic and hence within the realm of what
the text describes as “savviness.” See generally, e.g., Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick,
Top-Management Team Tenure and Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 484 (1990) (discussing “strategic conformity” in a managerial setting).
Cf. Eric L. Talley, Precedential Cascades, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999) (describing a cascade effect as
when strategic actors rationally prefer to emulate the behavior of others, presuming that their own
information is unreliable and positing that this phenomenon is unlikely in the evolution of law
because of institutional practices in the judiciary that prevent bad cascades).
McAdams, supra note 59 at 356–58 (explaining “pluralistic ignorance”).
Cass R. Sunstein, Unleashed, 85 SOC. RES. 73 (2018) (arguing that people often falsify their
preferences based on their perception of others’ preferences but that the erosion of social norms
“unleashes” people in that they can reveal their prior preferences and create new norms).
See also Elster, supra note 48, at 36.
In particular, situations of pluralistic ignorance in politics seem much more prevalent in
authoritarian regimes, given that the control over the means of communication and information
dissemination is in the hands of the rulers. See, e.g., Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 130–35
(describing how authoritarian governments control and distort information).
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of immediate precedential constraint in high stakes political matters that seems
much more common in politics relates to the other source from which constraint
from the past can stem: the second-order norm of political stare decisis.
In the discussion so far, the two sources of constraint by the past have
worked in tandem. The norm of political stare decisis seemed to create constraints
and identify political precedents when these precedents were also indicative of
political norms of the first-order. In many ways, however, the whole point of a
second-order norm of political stare decisis is to achieve constraint even beyond
these cases—when some things are best left decided, even if they may be wrong,
because of the values of political cooperation or the possible (real or anticipated)
reactions of the institutions of politics, political peers, or the public. The question
of whether constraint can quickly arise even if the political stakes are not low
appears then directly reliant on the force of the norm of political stare decisis itself.
As a general matter, we have good reasons to suspect that the norm of
political stare decisis is quite weak. For one, as we have previously seen,225 the
norm creates lower rhetorical or discursive burdens than does the parallel norm
of judicial stare decisis. For another, as I will discuss below, the norm of political
stare decisis is more easily overridden than its judicial counterpart.226
Despite this, I believe we can make some generalizations, though inevitably
crude ones, about when the norm of political stare decisis is more likely to produce
constraint (or less likely to do so). The key is to identify when the forces that
support and first give life to that norm will be particularly powerful (or weak).
(1) The Value of Cooperation.

Start with cooperative logic underlying the norm of political stare decisis.
Though adhering to the norm of political stare decisis can signal willingness to
engage in cooperative political exchange, the value of political cooperation is likely
to change with context and institutions. The current state of political polarization
that exists around the world obviously weakens the value of political cooperation
and, thus, likely decreases the level of constraint by the past and the ability of the
norm of political stare decisis to generate quick political precedents. In addition,
when one political party to the cooperative endeavor finds it can systematically
get what it desires even without cooperating—because, for instance, it is the
stronger party in the political relationship—its willingness to abide by “things
decided” even if it believes them to be wrong will similarly weaken.227
225

226
227

See Fallon, Jr., supra note 38; Pozen & Samaha, supra note 39. See also text accompanying notes 38–
39.
See infra Section V.A.
See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Nash Equilibrium and International Law, 23 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 915, 936 (2012)
(discussing how the unequal bargaining power of actors affects the costs and benefits of
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(2) Degree of Institutional “Loyalty.”

Recall too that the norm of political stare decisis relies in part on the
expectation of what some have called institutional “loyalty.”228 It is clear, though,
that some institutions in politics are more demanding in their expectation of
loyalty from members than others. This partly depends on specific organizational
structures and how well the relevant political organization socializes (or
“imprints”)229 its members into those structures, including through processes of
employee selection and retention.230 But it also partly depends on the institution’s
goals and on the members’ professional backgrounds.231 For instance, legislatures
are probably less demanding of institutional loyalty than are, say, administrative
agencies, which are largely staffed with career officials. And legislatures with
higher turnover rates and less permanent staff will likely be less loyalty-demanding
than will legislatures with lower turnover rates and more permanent staff.232
Similarly, an administrative agency or supranational organization that has more
“in-house” lawyers and strong and influential legal departments will likely demand
more political stare decisis than will agencies and organizations that are less
legalized in this way.233
(3) Decisional Context.

We have also seen that the norm of political stare decisis depends on
professional, peer, or public expectations from officials to adhere to the past.
There is reason to think, however, that these expectations will be stronger in some
decisional contexts and weaker in others. Consider, for instance, how the demands
from public officials to act professionally and abide by the past may be stronger
when the political matters are procedural or organizational rather than

228
229

non-compliance). But see Verdier & Voeten, supra note 74, at 408 (suggesting that powerful states
have a strong incentive to comply with the past because the precedential nature of noncompliance
is especially high).
See Fontana & Huq, supra note 75.
Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 142
(James G. March ed., 1965).
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The various components of what institutional “loyalty” consists of are surveyed in Fontana & Huq,
supra note 75, at 38–64.
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See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving, Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 530–
51 (2015) (describing the different professionals and officials who serve in administrative agencies).
For the role of legislative staffers, see Fontana & Huq, supra note 75, at 76–83.
Indeed, the significant role of lawyers in departments like OLC is very much what accounts for its
relatively robust practice of abiding by past decisions. See generally Morrison, supra note 13. For the
claim that the existence of lawyers in international organizations increases the likelihood that a
practice of constraint by precedent will emerge, see Harlan G. Cohen, Lawyers and Precedent, 46
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1025 (2013).
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substantive.234 Consider also how if issues are labeled “constitutional” rather than
as related to matters of “regular” politics, public expectations for restraint could
increase further.235 In a similar vein, although the public might expect a measure
of fairness in dealings among public officials, that expectation may be weak when
the public develops more concrete opinions about the policy matters at hand. 236
When this occurs, the public may care less about adhering to the past and would
prefer to get things right.
(4) “Tipping Points.”

Finally, decisions about whether to abide by the norm of political stare
decisis are likely not made in isolation. Past record matters. Suppose a certain
public official or political institution has a record of not being constrained by past
events. It is very likely that there will be some tolerance for recalcitrant behavior,
which will not shatter the norm of political stare decisis itself. It is also likely,
however, that the norm of political stare decisis will have a “tipping point”237
beyond which recalcitrance will not be tolerated, either because when the
decision-maker crosses that point, her cooperativeness ceases to be credible, or
because the sanction-based forces that support the norm of political stare decisis
begin to appear.
***
For all these reasons, the conclusion at the end of Subsection C about the
challenges in establishing political precedents in “one go” should indeed be
qualified. In some cases, political precedents will be generated (or become
identified) only retrospectively or in a cumulative fashion. In other cases, political
precedents will be generated (or identified) rather quickly, and the constraint they
bring with them will also be more readily apparent—just as in judicial stare decisis.
Tables 1 & 3 further below will summarize the key takeaways from this Section.

V. O VE RRU LING P OLITIC AL P RE C E DE NTS
Suppose that a political precedent has been established in domestic and
international politics in accordance with one of the possible routes discussed in
Section IV. Obviously, the story does not end there. Precedents, after all, can be
234
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An analogy is the well-known distinction between structure and rights in constitutional law and the
claim that, in many circumstances, issues of structure are more self-entrenching than issues of rights.
See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124
HARV. L. REV. 657, 692–97 (2011).
See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is… Article V, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 51 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998)
(highlighting the effects that labeling something as “constitutional” carries with the public).
See Vermeule, supra note 81, at 426.
See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 83–110 (1978) (developing a
“tipping point” model).
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ignored or overruled, even if they did previously constrain political decision
makers. But how?
The analogy to judicial stare decisis, described in Section III, suggests that
the overruling of political precedents might not be so different from the
overruling of judicial precedents. Much like we saw in Section IV in relation to
the question of establishing political precedents, however, this analogy is partial
and can also prove misleading in the stage of the potential overruling of these
precedents. This Section shows why. Subsection A argues that political precedents
are more fragile than judicial precedents and can be overruled much more easily. By
contrast, Subsection B argues that in some cases, the reverse is true and political
precedents may prove even more resilient than judicial precedents. It will be
incredibly hard to overrule them.

A. The Increased Fragility of Political Precedents
1. Expiration without express overruling: the Nike principle and
overruling as fait accompli
Political precedents seem fragile, especially when compared with judicial
precedents. One reason for this is obvious: politics is informal and we do not
expect public officials to reason about precedents and justify their departures from
previous decisions in the same way as we expect judges and lawyers to do so. As
previously mentioned,238 even if the past does constrain public officials, in politics,
the expectation to reason about precedents may be very weak, even nonexistent.
And decision makers will simply be able to ignore previous precedents without
explaining why. Borrowing from Mark Tushnet, we may call this the Nike
Principle, whereby overruling of past political precedents can be achieved if
decision-makers “Just Do It.”239
There is, however, another, less obvious, explanation for this fragility of
political precedents. In principle, even if the political world is more informal than
law, we may imagine a situation in which earlier political precedents must be
“informally overruled” before decision makers are permitted to dispense with
those earlier precedents. In effect, the precedent would be required to be
politically “tested”—that is, before officials could decide to overrule the
precedent, they would need to first examine the political reality of whether the
precedent applies and has force. This is, in essence, what we have in law. A central
legal craft norm is that judicial rulings are considered valid unless they are “tested”

238

See Fallon, Jr., supra note 38; Pozen & Samaha, supra note 39. See also text accompanying notes 38–
39.
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See generally Mark Tushnet, Amending an Unwritten Constitution: Comparative Perspectives (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
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in the authoritative court.240 Thus, judges continue to refer to a judicial precedent,
so long as it has not been squarely challenged, notwithstanding how much time
has passed since the day it was rendered. And court spectators cannot confidently
presume that a judicial precedent that has not been applied or reaffirmed in
subsequent cases has expired and left the “precedential pool.” In other words,
there is always a chance that a court would say, “[R]eliance upon a square,
unabandoned holding of the [highest court] is always justifiable reliance.”241
But much like we saw in Section IV regarding the legal craft norms that
instruct judges and lawyers to treat judicial precedents as constraining in “one go”
and to refrain from exploring the real motivation behind the precedent or a pivotal
judge’s vote,242 it is unlikely that a similar craft norm that requires informal
“testing” would develop in politics. And, again, like we saw in Section IV, this lack
of a similar craft norm in politics is consequential for how political stare decisis
operates and creates an important difference with the operation of judicial stare
decisis.
Suppose some time had passed from the political precedent-triggering event.
Suppose further that during this time, the officials that were supposed to adhere
to the precedent did not resort to it nor rely on it. At some point, the lack of
affirmations will raise the kinds of questions that, as we saw in Section IV, are
crucial for the generation of political precedents in the first place—questions
about “What comes next?” and about the true beliefs of political participants.
Observers know that political preferences and beliefs are not static. And as time
passes, decision makers will reasonably begin to question whether the conditions
that made a political precedent constraining in the past still endure—that is,
whether the precedent indicates that the political norm persists or remains as
robust as it once was.243 What if, for example, the relevant decision makers no
longer believe in the precedent and the norm it supports or in its desirability as
they had in the past? And what if their support for that precedent and the norm
it reflects has weakened, and they are no longer willing to follow the precedent or
enforce it with the same enthusiasm or at the same institutional or personal cost?
What if the relevant political norm is completely forgotten?
If political decision makers conclude that any of the above is true and given
that there is no requirement to “test” the precedent before its abandonment, they
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See Daniel R. Rice & Jack Boeglin, Confining Cases to their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 865, 893–94 (2019).
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 320–21 (1992) (Scalia J., dissenting). On the rejection
of the idea of “anticipatory overruling” in Canadian jurisprudence, see Debra Perks, Precedent
Unbound? Contemporary Approaches to Precedent in Canada, 32 MANITOBA L.J. 135, 144–46 (2007).
See infra Section IV.C.1.
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Cf. Joseph Jaconelli, Do Constitutional Conventions Bind?, 64 CAMB. L.J. 149, 168 (2005).
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might simply decide to ignore the precedent.244 The relevant precedent at this
point no longer convincingly indicates the existence of a political norm. And its
constraining force will be severely weakened, even to the point of expiration.
Anyone who would protest will face a fait accompli.
Note that in addition to the craft norm that requires “testing,” judicial
institutions generally have features that help secure the resilience of judicial
precedents that are not explicitly tested or reaffirmed. And political institutions
may lack these features. First, judiciaries operate through formal means, and their
precedents are almost always memorialized.245 By contrast, political institutions’
precedents are mostly informal in nature and are not memorialized in the same
systematized manner. Thus, these precedents are at a real risk of being forgotten
if not reaffirmed.246 Second, turnover in judiciaries is usually less frequent than in
political institutions (especially in judicial systems that provide judges life
tenure).247 This means that observers of judicial precedents are usually confronted
less often with the possibility of changed beliefs and expectations about the
validity of past precedents as a consequence of new entrants onto the scene
compared with observers of political precedents. Finally, judicial institutions,
unlike many political institutions, are usually somewhat removed from the political
fray and enjoy some independence from immediate political dynamics.248
Consequently, even if there are indications that the beliefs and preferences of
244

245
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See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal Remedies, ‘Legalized
Noncompliance,’ and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 287–88 (2011) (discussing an example of
unilateral efficient breach in international law as a mode of change).
For complications, see, for example, Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2005) (discussing the phenomenon of unpublished
rulings); Julius Schumann, Precedents—A Question of Memory, in PRECEDENTS AS RULES AND
PRACTICE: NEW APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES IN STUDIES OF LEGAL PRECEDENTS 157
(Amalie Frese & Julius Schumann eds., 2021) (discussing differences between courts in Central
Europe in how they store precedents).
Cf. Vermeule, supra note 81, at 434–35 (raising the possibility of political forgetfulness).
For surveys and analysis of judicial terms of service, from a comparative perspective, see John
Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671
(2004). See also Tom Ginsburg, Term Limits and Turnover on the U.S. Supreme Court: A Comparative View,
Testimony for the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court, July 20, 2021,
https://perma.cc/PN9S-DY3N. For discussion of turnover in politics, see, for example, Fontana
& Huq, supra note 75, at 45–51.
For a description of the development of independent judicial institutions, to relative degrees, in a
range of politics, see TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003); Gretchen Helmke & Frances Rosenbluth, Regimes and the Rule of
Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 345 (2009). For a discussion
of the recent trend of increased politicization of judiciaries, see Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of
Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI. 93 (2008). And for a discussion
of how in recent years judicial independence is especially being threatened, see Kriszta Kovacs, The
Fragility of an Independent Judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland—and the European Union, 51
COMMUNIST AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES 189 (2018).
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judges and lawyers are gradually changing, the effects of the change may not reach
courts, at least without some significant lag.249

2. Greater possibilities of overruling (I): lower thresholds and the role
of “power, not reason”
Political precedents are more fragile than judicial ones in another key respect:
in law, the bar for overruling prior judicial precedents is described as a relatively
high one—“special justifications”250 or “compelling reasons” 251 may be required.
Moreover, a judge who seeks to disregard a previous judicial precedent is limited
to offering only valid “legal” reasons in justifying that choice.252
But political decision makers will not be constrained in the same way. For
one, the threshold for disregarding political precedents will generally be lower in
politics.253 As mentioned,254 though we may want public officials to be constrained
by past decisions, our level of tolerance of getting things wrong in politics may be
lower than it is in law. In politics, we often want what is right for today, not what
was right for yesterday. Yet, even if the standard for overruling were identical in
politics and law, this would not be enough. In politics, decision makers are
obviously not limited to offering only “legal” justifications for overruling; they can
offer political reasons too. Those political reasons, which can involve pure
self-interest or distributional considerations (and even pork-barrel politics), greatly
expand the opportunities for overruling.
Indeed, a powerful charge that could be leveled against a judge for
disregarding a precedent merely for “[p]ower, not reason”255 is much less effective
in politics. It might be completely beside the point.
249
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For an example of how the structural features of courts create this sort of lag between the political
and judicial spheres, see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001).
This is the U.S. standard, at least as most of the Justices at the Supreme Court seem to accept. For
a useful discussion of the law and complications, see Randy J. Kozel, Special Justifications, 33 CONST.
COMMENT. 471 (2018). On the difference between constitutional and statutory precedents,
however, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988).
This is the standard that seems to be accepted in Canada. For discussion, see LAWRENCE DAVID,
STARE DECISIS, THE CHARTER, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 47–98
(2020). For discussions of the Australian High Court’s mixed approach to overruling precedents,
see Matthew Harding & Ian Malkin, Overruling in the High Court of Australia in Common Law Cases, 34
MELBOURNE L. REV. 17 (2010).
See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1991) (arguing that in constitutional law,
“[n]ot just any argument will do, and a political argument per se will never do . . . and the standards of legal
argument—neutrality, generality, consistency—are not the standards of the political operative”).
See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 13, at 1455 (arguing that the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department
of Justice may depart from their precedents more frequently and easily than courts).
See Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,
at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)); supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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3. Greater possibilities of overruling (II): the increased risk of
“anti-canonity” of political precedents
A related issue, worth emphasizing separately, concerns the different role
blaming plays in law and in politics. In judicial decision-making, blame is a valid
cause for discarding judicial precedents only in extremely limited cases. One
reason for the difference is that it is usually difficult to blame judiciaries and their
precedents directly for political or policy failures. Judicial institutions are thought
to be passive institutions, which supposedly have “no influence over either the
sword or the purse”256 and do not normally intervene with policymaking on a
regular and systemic basis.
Another reason, however, is that, by accepted legal “craft” norms, the
“anti-canon” of judicial precedents is an exclusive club, so to speak.257 To enter it,
a judicial precedent ought to be nearly “wrong the day it was decided.”258 In other
words, it needs to be associated with a reality that has been so significantly
repudiated (or the judges ought to have been so severely morally corrupt)259 that
relying on it would be almost unthinkable.260 Consequently, and perhaps too
because of the increased tendency in law to generalize, 261 judicial precedents can
still stand their ground even if the decisions are deeply unfavorable or were
rendered by judges whom history views negatively. The (in)famous Korematsu case,
which allowed for the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II,
serves as one potential example from the U.S.262
Politics is different. In contrast to judiciaries, political institutions generally
do hold the sword and the purse, and they do engage with relevant policies in a
direct and systematic way. Blaming political actors and institutions for policy
failures therefore makes much more sense. Moreover, contrary to law, politics is
a field that also permits constant personal and institutional blaming. In fact,
blaming may not only be allowed in politics but may be the primary way elections
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The Federalist No. 78, 523 (Alexander Hamilton).
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 18, at 466–68.
See Jack M. Balkin, Wrong the Day It Was Decided: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV.
677 (2005).
See generally Barzun, supra note 147 (discussing the dynamics of how precedents in law might be
“impeached”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Tainted Precedent, 74 ARK. L. REV. 291 (2021) (similar).
For an attempt to expand this craft norm and formalize it, see Daniel B. Rice, Repugnant Precedents
and the Court of History (2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Chicago Journal of
International Law).
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217 (2004).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018). But see also Jamal Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?, 128 YALE L.J.F. 629 (2019) (suggesting
that the Court’s declaration in Trump that it was overruling Korematsu was empty).
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are won and policy lessons are learned.263 For these reasons, the world of politics
seems much less conducive to the stability and longevity of the precedents
generated in it. Even much less severe policy failures can cause a political
precedent to be considered “anti-canonical.” And political precedents can become
anti-canonical for merely strategic reasons as well—that is, even if the blame
directed against these precedents is insincere and justified by the strategic benefits
achieved by blaming the proponents of these precedents.
It is worth noting that the risk of political precedents becoming
“anti-canonical” may be especially high in situations of personnel turnover in
politics. In systems that adhere to stare decisis,264 overruling judicial precedents
“upon a ground no firmer than a change in [a court’s] membership” could
potentially do “lasting injury” to the institution of the judiciary.265 Not so in
politics. The arrival of new public officials to the scene may work in reverse, and
we might reasonably expect some expiration of past precedents. Consider a newly
appointed decision maker to a political institution. They might want to
differentiate from their predecessors by charting a new path, including by retiring
old ways and precedents. Or they may have been explicitly selected or elected to
the post on a “reform” ticket and therefore seek to cast aside old precedents that
they believe are responsible for prior institutional failures. In these latter cases,
even if the decision makers believe—or discover after their appointment—that
their predecessors were correct in establishing certain precedents and following
them, the circumstances of the departure of their predecessors from office might
make these precedents unavailable to the decision maker.

4. Qualifications
Although political precedents seem much more fragile than judicial ones for
all the reasons mentioned above, some important qualifications seem to apply and
should be emphasized.
To begin, many of the rationales discussed in Section IV as contributing to
the ease of the generation or identification of political precedents also contribute
to their resilience at the stage of potential overruling. In particular, low-stakes

263

264
265

See generally CHRISTOPHER HOOD, THE BLAME GAME: SPIN, BUREAUCRACY, AND
SELF-PRESERVATION IN GOVERNMENT (2011).
See supra notes 1, 40–41 and accompanying text.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Rehan Abeyrante &
Iddo Porat, Introduction: Towering Judges—A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis, in TOWERING JUDGES—A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 1, 12 (Rehan Abeyrante & Iddo Porat eds., 2021)
(mentioning, in relation to the German legal system, a strong tradition “that shies away from
personalization of judgment and from the glorification of individual judges”).
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political precedents seem to be at especially low risk of being overruled; no one
may simply bother or want to do so.266
But, even for high-stakes political precedents, attempts at overruling are far
from guaranteed. Perhaps decision makers may be too risk-averse, or the political
organization is characterized by a “risk culture” that would prevent attempts at
overruling.267 Perhaps, too, appropriate opportunities for decision makers or
institutions to overrule such precedents are simply unavailable. It is also possible
that despite the lack of reaffirmations of a certain political precedent or “testing,”
there might still be enough evidence to suggest that the political norm the
precedent supports remains robust or internalized in a sufficiently thick way that
decision makers are reluctant to upset it. And even if there is no affirmative
evidence, pluralistic ignorance might achieve the same result.268
Political precedents involving high-stakes situations may prove resilient for
other reasons, too. Consider the possibility of standardizing politics and its
precedents, discussed above.269 It is not unthinkable that some attempts to
standardize politics could limit the ability of decision makers to rely on otherwise
politically available routes to “overrule” political precedents. Finally, the strength
of the norm of political stare decisis also matters. As we saw, this norm is
especially robust when decision makers put a high premium on political
cooperation, when domestic and international political institutions exhibit a high
degree of institutional “loyalty,” in moments at which public and peer
expectations to adhere to the past are likely high, and when an institution is close
to the “tipping point.”270 Much like these features of the political environment
encourage political decision makers to identify events as precedential and
consequently constrain themselves, they will also likely cause decision makers to
be reluctant to overrule political precedents too easily even if these are high-stakes
ones.
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Importantly, note that these low-stakes political precedents could either be (1) precedents that were
low-stakes at the point at which they first occurred and remained so through time, or (2) political
precedents that were initially high-stakes but over time transformed to be low-stakes (for example,
because time had passed, public officials had come and gone, and the precedent had been followed
so regularly that it had become an event that in essence signals the existence of a “coordination
norm”).
See Bozeman & Kingsley, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Indeed, social science research has found that there is often a “conservative lag” in how norms
ultimately decay, and it is plausible that a similar dynamic may appear also in politics. See Dale T.
Miller & Deborah A. Prentice, Collective Errors and Errors about the Collective, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. BULL. 541, 543–44 (1994).
See supra Section IV.D.2.
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B. The Increased Resilience of Politica l Precedents
In the previous Subsection, I argued that precedents in politics are more
fragile than precedents in law (subject to some qualifications). Here I emphasize
that the reverse can also be true.
In law, whenever a relevant number of judges on a court (usually a majority,
but, as we saw, not necessarily so)271 have sufficiently serious and justifiable legal
reasons, a judicial precedent can be overruled. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice
William Brennan famously counseled his clerks, “with five votes, you [can]
accomplish anything.”272 But in politics, the equivalent to having transient
majorities may not be enough. Sometimes political precedents are so thickly
internalized that overruling them would prove tremendously difficult even the
decision maker appears to have real power to do so.
There are two primary ways political precedents can become sticky such that
they are resistant to being overruled. The first is when the political precedent
reaches a level of “cognitive hegemony”273 where those who abide by it simply
cannot conceive of doing anything different. In such cases, attempts to overrule
the political precedent would most likely prove futile, even if the one who is trying
to do so is entirely correct that the precedent is nothing more than a “dogma[ ] of
the quiet past” that is no longer suitable for “the stormy present.”274
For example, the agreement signed in September 1938 between Germany,
Italy, France, and the United Kingdom that allowed Adolf Hitler to annex large
parts of Czechoslovakia is often referred to as the “Munich analogy”275 or
“precedent.”276 That precedent suggests that capitulation to aggressive dictatorial
regimes is futile and should never be pursued—just as the appeasement of Hitler
in Munich proved futile and even counterproductive in stopping Hitler’s invasion
to Poland and the beginning of World War II.277 Many foreign relations scholars
believe that the Munich precedent has grown into a full-blown “syndrome,” in
which decision makers have become so trapped in that historical analogy that they
are unable to consider circumstances in which appeasement would have been

271

See supra note 87 and accompanying text.

272

SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 196 (2010).

273

See Vermeule, supra note 48, at 1190–91.
See Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in 5 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
See JEFFREY RECORD, THE SPECTER OF MUNICH: RECONSIDERING THE LESSONS OF APPEASING HITLER
1–13 (2007).
Patrick Hagopian, Histories and “Lessons” of the Vietnam War, in PARTISAN HISTORIES: THE PAST IN
CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL POLITICS 167, 181 (Max Paul Friedman & Padraic Kenney eds., 2005).

274

275

276

277

Id.

556

Vol. 22 No. 2

Political Stare Decisis

Tamir

quite obviously beneficial. Indeed, a well-known book described foreign policy
officials, in adhering to the Munich precedent, as “prisoners of the past.”278
Cognitively hegemonic political precedents of this kind are clearly important.
But they do not exhaust the category of interest. Another situation in which
political precedents can prove incredibly sticky, much more than we think of
precedents in law, is when their thick internalization stems from politics, not
cognition. In other words, when political precedents become politically hegemonic.
This can happen most clearly when the political precedent becomes so
closely affiliated with what literature sometimes calls a political “regime”279 or a
“constitutional order,”280 that it cannot easily be disposed of, at least so long as
that regime or order remains resilient. To illustrate this, consider, the following
well-known story.281 Before assuming office and during his election campaign,
candidate Barack Obama campaigned vigorously against many of President
George W. Bush’s aggressive practices concerning the War on Terror and
promised to get rid of them. However, once in office, Obama ended up retaining
many of the practices he had dismissed as a candidate.282 What accounts for this?
Partly, the beliefs and preferences of President Obama and those in his
administration may have changed once they entered the White House and learned
more about the risks of terror.283 But another plausible explanation seems to be
that the Bush administration past practices on the War on Terror became
politically hegemonic. These practices were essentially incorporated into a political
regime or a constitutional order in the U.S. that is now fully devoted to what some
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have called the “National Security State”284 or to the entrenchment an “infinity
war.”285
To be sure, the resilience of political precedents that become politically
hegemonic is not guaranteed. And, indeed, President Obama was able to dismiss
or overrule some of his predecessor’s precedents regarding the War on Terror.286
Nonetheless, at least when the political regime or constitutional order remains
resilient, and so long as the political precedents in question are central to its
agenda—and “compensating adjustments” cannot be devised287—the overruling
of precedent may ultimately prove temporary. The relevant political precedents
might be reinstalled in the short to medium term.288

VI. T HE P U BLIC AND P OLITIC AL P RE CE DE NTS
Sections IV & V illustrated that political stare decisis is a complex
phenomenon. Political precedents can be established either quickly or with time
(Section IV), and they can prove either extremely fragile or extremely resilient
(Section V). In this Section, I introduce a final complication regarding political
precedents that has to do with the role of the public at large.
In both law and politics, the public is obviously an important audience that
judicial and political institutions surely consider.289 However, the frequency with
which institutions in law and politics must address the public as an audience, or
the weight that they should give the public, likely differs between the two spheres.
In law, even when the public is alert to judicial activity and judges care about the
views of the public, the legal profession serves as a crucial “intermediary” between
the public and the precedents courts produce. This is especially true when judicial
precedents appear somewhat technical in nature and in systems where the public’s
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perception is that a relatively strong separation exists between law and politics.290
Judicial precedents, therefore, are not normally vulnerable to any differences that
might exist between the legal profession and the nonlegal world. By contrast,
political precedents likely do not enjoy the same level of “acoustic separation”291
and intermediation that exists in law. Even though politics has been
professionalized to a certain degree, as we saw,292 politicians are probably much
weaker intermediaries than “the professional experts who make up the lawyer
class.”293 Consequently, what the public believes, knows, or understands about
politics will have a powerful influence on political stare decisis’s operation.

A. Effectively Unknown Political Precedents
Here is the first implication of this sort of divergence between politics and
law: If law is less penetrable to the public, then for judicial precedents to achieve
their constraining force, it is enough for these precedents to be known within the
legal profession. But in politics, that may not suffice. Some precedents known
within the world of politics will be ineffective if they are unknown outside of it and
“do not arouse general interest.”294
Consider the following illustration of this pivotal role of the public in
generating precedential constraint in politics: in the U.K., Canada, and Australia,
the Queen (or her representatives) holds the power to refuse “royal assent,” which
can prevent legislation from gaining force.295 However, a widespread belief across
Westminster systems is that because the power to refuse royal assent has not been
exercised since 1708, it has become obsolete.296 There is, in effect, a powerful
political precedent against the power to refuse assent.297
In an important study, Australian scholar Anne Twomey has however
brought to light findings that seem to complicate this powerful precedent. What
Twomey found was that well beyond 1708, the monarchy and its representatives
occasionally threatened to deny legislative assent,298 threats that were often taken
quite seriously. Nonetheless, Twomey also emphasizes that there were no overt acts
290
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of refusal to provide assent to legislation by the monarchy and its
representatives.299 The instances Twomey discovered remained at most an
“internal” governmental issue, not known by the public at large.
During the fierce political discussions in the U.K. about “Brexit,” some tried
to rely on Twomey’s study to claim that the Queen would be justified in refusing
royal assent because the precedent against doing so is in fact more qualified as
Twomey’s findings suggest.300 Ultimately, this did not transpire as the Queen did
provide assent for the legislation in question. And, while we cannot be sure, one
reason for this might be exactly that the precedents Twomey’s study identified
were irrelevant in the most important sense: the public who enforces that
precedent against refusing of assent was simply unaware of them. All the public
knows is that since 1708, the monarchy has never refused assent. And that may
be all that matters for the effectivity of the precedent.

B. Cognitive and Political Intake of Political Precedents
One solution to the problem of effectively unknown precedents seems
simple: make these precedents known to the public, both as a general matter but
especially in real time. And in some cases, this may solve the issue. For instance,
Professor Nicholas Parrillo’s recent study of administrative agencies’ guidance
documents in the U.S. discovered that agencies often make exceptions to what
these guidance documents determine.301 Parrillo also found, however, that these
exceptions are mostly unknown to outside stakeholders.302 Accordingly, Parrillo’s
suggestion is to make the exceptions known so they could essentially become
effective precedents and constrain officials within those agencies.303
But in politics, making the unknown known might not be enough. The
stakeholders of the policy made by the agencies Parrillo studied may be
sophisticated, just as we assume lawyers who observe courts and judicial
precedents are sophisticated. But the public at large, whose view the precedent’s
efficacy hinges on, might not be similarly sophisticated. Informational gaps
between the internal political world and the more diffuse public would likely exist.
And some issues that appear important for political insiders about the
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precedent-creating event might not be sufficiently salient or vivid to outsiders.304
In such circumstances, political precedents might fail to be generated in the way
political elites would want them to be not because they are unknown to the public.
Rather, they will fail, despite being known, because the public will not be as
receptive to the information political elites assume.
As an example, consider this: we previously saw the political precedent
according to which the chair of the Budget Committee in the Bundestag should
come from the opposition party.305 In the past, some advocated for a more narrow
reading of that precedent, arguing that it should not preclude the appointed chair
from being a legislator from a coalition party so long as their views on budgetary
policies are substantively different from those of the Finance Minister.306 This view
certainly has logic. At the same time, there are also reasons to wonder whether this
distinction would actually work to the extent that the public is the one “enforcing”
the relevant precedent. From the public’s perspective, all that might matter is
whether the Finance Minister comes from the opposition party or not; the nuances
of internal coalitional dynamics might not be salient enough to resonate with the
public. Proceeding in practice according to the proposed narrow reading of the
precedent might be interpreted by the public as an overruling of the precedent, not
its narrowing down (as those who have suggested it intended it to be understood).
The types of gaps that I have just emphasized are informational and
cognitive in nature. But sometimes there could be important political gaps too.
More specifically, on occasion we may find that there is a discrepancy between the
way professionalized politics is understood by relevant political “professionals,”
on one hand, and the public perception of what political professionalism should
entail, on the other hand.
Obviously, a complete divergence between the two spheres is impossible, as
political actors are ultimately drawn from the public. Nonetheless, some gaps are
likely to exist between the spheres at some points in time, partly because in the
short term, politics is always imperfectly responsive to the public.307 Where such
political gaps exist, they will likely have an important impact on political stare
decisis. In particular, for political precedents to constrain, they need to speak to
the publicly perceived standards of appropriate political behavior rather than to
the standards that political elites believe apply to them. In other words, the
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precedents need to consider the “logic of appropriateness”308 that is alive in the
mind of a more diffuse public.
In many cases, this gap has implications for the degree of aggressiveness of
political behavior that will be required for it to be taken as precedential. For
instance, for a political precedent to be established in polities where the public is
highly cynical of politicians, political actors will need to become more brutish than
they otherwise would be in order to convince the public that a precedent has been
established.309 By contrast, when politicians are more cynical and brutish than the
public, they might need to tone down their more aggressive political tendencies if
they hope to register their behavior as a successful political precedent.310
***
Having discussed at length in Sections IV–VI how judicial and political stare
decisis diverge, Tables 1–3 below provide a summary of the key takeaways that
emerge from the inquiry:
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VII. P RE SC RIP TIONS
So far, my discussion of political stare decisis has been limited to explanatory
and analytic lenses. But the analysis does lend itself to some prescriptive insights
as well.

A. Precedenting: How to Make or Break Political Precedents
From a social standpoint, in any given political system or institution, there
could be either too much or too little political stare decisis. As mentioned in the
Introduction, many believe that much of what is wrong with domestic and
international politics today is that too much of the past is being eroded.311 By
contrast, others think that even today much of the past proves unjustly sticky in
both global and domestic politics.312 They would want to see less political stare
decisis today.
The issue is normatively vexing, and I doubt whether any general account
could resolve the debate. Nonetheless, understanding the operation of political
stare decisis seems to offer some helpful prescriptions for those involved in this
debate. In particular, understanding political stare decisis points to the way public
officials can behave in order to create successful political precedents that will
genuinely constrain public officials, whether these are completely new precedents
or rather precedents meant to strengthen or weaken existing ones.
We can call this sort of activity, in short, “precedenting.” And based on the
discussion in Sections IV–VI, we can moreover identify its core elements.

1. The craft
First, precedenting aims for political events and decisions that can satisfy the
informational burden that is needed to create constraint by the past in politics,
particularly in high-stakes matters. As we saw in Sections II and IV, these are
events and decisions that can deliver information indicating the existence or
potential emergence of political norms. Accordingly, when the political precedent
constrains based on its cooperative logic, precedenting means aiming for
galvanizing events that strongly signal the existence of such political cooperation. By contrast,
when the risk of political sanctions gives the political precedent its constraining
force, precedenting means aiming for decisive political victories (rather than mere
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“brushbacks”),313 including by picking the timing at which the necessary political
or social penalties will most likely be doled out.314
Second, those who engage in precedenting should seek to avoid the kind of
ambiguities that decrease the informational power of political events or decisions
and their likelihood of becoming efficacious political precedents. This means that
those who engage in precedenting should avoid negating and self-negating statements.
And they should also act in ways that do not appear to be motivated by purely legal
considerations or purely opportunistic ones, but that signal the sincere belief in the
precedential force of the event.
Third, given the retrospective or cumulative nature of many political
precedents, and given their potential to be easily overruled at a later stage,
precedenting requires thinking of the task not as a “single shot” enterprise, as we
often think of precedents in law. To the contrary: precedenting is a continuous
and steady task. Thus, precedenting requires the regular reaffirmation of the initial
precedent.315 That way, precedenting can cumulatively support the emergence of the
political norm that ultimately makes political precedents constraining.
Alternatively, if the political norm that the precedent supports already emerged,
the steady reaffirmation signals the continued belief in it and prevents it from
being forgotten or weakened which, as we saw, may be a real risk in politics in
contrast to law.316
Fourth, because of the increased risk of anti-canonicity of political
precedents, precedenting also requires that those who engage in it to scrupulously
protect their overall legacy (or the legacy of the institution they are affiliated with).
This means that precedenting should lead decision makers to consider whether
they may need to resign from their posts if, for instance, their continued presence
jeopardizes the resilience of the relevant political precedents (or, conversely, extend
their tenure if there is concern over the wreckage to these precedents that might be
caused by their replacements).317 In addition, given the importance of positive
legacy for the survival of precedents, decision makers should moreover consider
engaging in valorization of these precedents, even in ways that might seem substantively
unjustified.318
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Finally, when the relevant audiences for the political precedents are likely to
be diffuse publics, precedenting entails being acutely aware of the pivotal role of
the public. This means that those who engage in precedenting should make sure
that the relevant political precedents are known to the public instead of merely
engaging in “smoke-filled-room” politicking.319 It also requires making sure that
the relevant precedents do not assume the background of political professionalism and speak
to the “logic of appropriateness” that captures the broader public’s mind about politics.

2. Negative and reactive precedenting
Thus far, I have described the craft of precedenting primarily from the point
of view of those who wish to create new political precedents or strengthen existing
ones. But the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to precedenting in the other
direction—when the goal is to weaken and ultimately replace existing political
precedents. The only difference is that when precedenting is taken with this
specific goal in mind—call it negative precedenting— it requires demonstrating
the inefficacy of the existing political precedent (for example, by aiming for
decisive “wins” that demonstrate there are no penalties for the breach of the previous
precedent or exposing the self-interestedness of those who adhere to it).320
Furthermore, once we recognize what the task of precedenting generally
entails, we can understand better how one should react to it when the other side
is engaging in it. For instance, to decrease the likelihood of negative precedenting,
those who wish to defend existing political precedents can try to undermine the
political events their opponents wish to use by resorting to negating statements or by
using whatever political clout they have to extract self-negating statements. In
situations where those engaging in negative precedenting look as though they may
be successful in a particular political environment but not in “the court of public
opinion,” those who resist the precedent change can try to shift the setting itself
by “going public”321 with the developments in the hope that informational gaps,
salience, or the logic of appropriateness among the public will complicate the
adverse precedent’s intake. Finally, to decrease the effectiveness of negative
precedenting, resisters can try to discredit, “trash-talk,” or even “demonize”322 the legacy
of the person who had attempted to set the adverse precedent (or the institution
with which that precedent is affiliated) and strategically blame them for policy
failures—in the hope that it will enjoy a short life inside the relevant political
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precedential pool. And resisters can also engage in what some call “memory
entrepreneuring,”323 which in this context means to deliberately deemphasize the
existence of the undesirable precedent—so it will be forgotten or get lost in a
“wilderness of dispersed incidents.”324

3. Is precedenting possible?
As should be obvious, the task of precedenting is quite difficult. At the most
basic level, it asks decision makers to manipulate two elements: politics and beliefs.
Such manipulation is undoubtedly hard, though. Decision makers cannot fully
control how political events occur, and they cannot wish people into believing in
something.
It is unsurprising, then, that some are skeptical that something like
precedenting is possible. Jon Elster, for example, voices doubts that it is possible
to create political precedents in a deliberate fashion to get “one’s foot in the
door.”325 And Adrian Vermeule notes that political norms (and, implicitly, the
political precedents that support them) “cannot be tailored to any arbitrarily
desired degree of nuance and suspended or activated at will.”326
Although this skepticism is understandable, the world of politics does appear
to leave some space for human agency and engagement in precedenting. 327 This
can happen in surprising, unanticipated ways but also in more systemic ones.
First, decision makers often do control the words that come out of their
mouths or appear in official records, which is precisely why they are drawn to
employ negating or self-negating statements.
Second, decision makers also often control informational flows into politics,
and through this, they can at least influence beliefs, even if they cannot guarantee
that those beliefs will end up where decision makers want them to be.328
Finally, when decision makers are in a secure position of power, their
political flexibility expands. They can more easily set the stage of politics, pick the
timing for their engagement, and make bolder moves that attempt to create
323
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political precedents or strengthen previously existing ones. And sufficiently
powerful political actors might also allow themselves to act in less opportunistic
ways than they would otherwise—which, as we saw,329 may be crucial for the
generation of political precedents.

4. More and less successful precedentors
Even if one remains skeptical about the prospects of deliberate precedenting,
the analysis offers other benefits. By understanding the operation of political stare
decisis, we can see who is likely to benefit more from political precedents in a
given system or context. We can also more reliably speculate on the circumstances
in domestic and international politics in which we are likely to observe more or
fewer political precedents.
For one thing, and perhaps obvious at this point, it is likely that existing
political precedents in a particular environment or system will benefit stronger
political actors or institutions rather than weaker ones.330 The reason for this is
not only that stronger political actors can set the stage of politics, but also that the
behavior of strong political actors serves as a stronger informational signal about
whether events in politics indicate the emergence or confirm the previous
existence of political norms.331 It is enough, in other words, to be strong, and
political precedents may follow.
The categories of strong or weak can be too crude, though. Sometimes
political institutions that operate in a certain environment (or even officials within
a specific institution) are strong or weak across various dimensions. And these
differences can be important for seeing who is likely to be a better precedentor.
Two dimensions stand out in particular. First, given that, as we saw,332
political precedents require both decisiveness and continuous work, political
precedents will likely benefit political institutions in political environments that
are more hierarchical or centralized than those that are less so. Second, for similar
reasons, political precedents are likely to work in favor of those who have greater
control over how the past is memorialized in politics, including those in charge of
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writing down potentially precedential events or decisions and their retrieval.333 As
an example, consider how skeptics of OLC’s ability to constrain presidents point
to its practice of memorializing only “affirmative precedents”334—that is,
precedents that support expansions of executive power. Or, perhaps from a
different political perspective, consider recent criticisms that were sounded in the
U.K. during Brexit that civil servants were “doctoring” the minutes of cabinet
meetings in order to delay the Brexit process.335
Institutions and political systems will likely also differ in their ability to
generate political precedents. For instance, given that the establishment of political
precedents is undermined when the beliefs in the generation of precedents are
ambiguous—because of the previously discussed problem of observational
equivalence336—the ability of institutions and political systems to generate political
precedents will be vulnerable to the relevant legal or political culture that exists
within them. In particular, the more the culture in a specific jurisdiction or context
is legalistic and characterized by what legal philosopher David Dyzenhaus calls
the “compulsion of legality,”337 the harder it will be to establish political precedents
in it, because law rather than something deeper will explain the behavior. Similarly,
the more a system’s political and constitutional culture permits self-interest and
opportunism—such as when a country is more committed to pluralist politics and
what comparative constitutional scholars describe as “culture of authority” rather
than “culture of justification”338—this, too, may result in a difficulty in establishing
political precedents within that system. More events or decisions that could have
potentially been considered precedential will be interpreted as pure opportunism
and thus will not generate political precedents.
We have seen as well that it may be difficult to establish political precedents
when the norm of political stare decisis is weak339 or when the public’s
less-mediated role in politics becomes significant (given informational gaps and
the potential for different logics of appropriateness).340 This suggests that the more
333
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See also GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 119–20 (discussing how the method of preservation and
documentation of debates in Congress may affect the content of the precedents generated there).
Rebecca Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy and the Internal Forces that Entrench Executive Power, 110
AM. J. INT’L L. 680, 692 (2016).
See Michelle Clement, Writing History: Why Are Civil Servants Being Accused of ‘Doctoring’ Cabinet
Minutes?, CIVIL SERV. WORLD (April 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/4ZG7-XRHA.
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David Dyzenhaus, The Compulsion of Legality, in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 33
(Victor V. Ramraj ed., 2008) (defining the compulsion of legality as the strong need of public
officials to justify their actions in reference to legal arguments).
On this distinction, see, for example, Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Foreword: Rights As
Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 64–65 (2018).
See supra Section IV.D.3.
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elitist a particular system is—in the sense of relying more systematically on a
robust political class and institutions rather than the force of public opinion or on
“personalized”341 politics—the more likely it is for political precedents to be
established. Indeed, some believe342 that this is precisely why the U.S. and the U.K.
are so different, in the sense that the latter, with its tradition of parliamentary
government rather than separation of powers and a more robust bureaucratic
class, is much more capable of relying on informal political precedents and norms
than the U.S.343
***
The following tables summarize the key takeaways from the discussion in
this Section so far:

341

342
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See, e.g., Ian McAllister, The Personalization of Politics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR 571 (2007).
See, e.g., Erin F. Delaney, Stability in Flexibility: A British Lens on Constitutional Success, in ASSESSING
CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 393 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq eds., 2016).
This claim may originate with James Bryce. See JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH
VOL. I 923 (1888). Note, though, that this does not speak to the dimension of resilience of political
precedents, and it is possible that political precedents that are less reliant on the public are more
fragile and could easily be changed or revoked. On this possibility, see HORWILL, supra note 190, at
201–02.
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B. Strengthening Political Stare Decisis (Generally)
The task of precedenting, as I have presented it so far, is directed to the level
of specific political precedents. But sometimes in politics, what we care about may
be broader: instead of caring about specific precedents, we may want political
institutions to generally be able to exhibit constraint of the past more frequently.
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This is not far-fetched. After all, the values that we associate with judicial
stare decisis, including stability, epistemic humility, and integrity,344 are not
exclusive to that domain. There may be contexts in politics where these values
seem exceedingly appealing as well.345 In addition, and perhaps especially given
the recent experience with the rise of “tradition-threatening” regimes around the
world,346 we may also be interested in thinking preemptively about how to design
institutions in politics in a way that would make them more immune from changes
that decrease the constraining effects of the past.
What paths are open for institutional designers who are interested in
achieving either of these goals? That is, in making political stare decisis generally
more robust?
Given the discussion here, one option institutional designers should clearly
consider relates to the norm of political stare decisis, which, as we saw, is precisely
what can cause public officials to adhere more regularly to the past, even in
high-stakes cases. Consequently, institutional designers who want to enhance the
weight of the past in decision-making precedents should turn their attention to
the forces that make this norm robust347 and consider how to structure political
institutions to strengthen it.348 For example, institutional designers should focus
on strategies for increasing political institutions’ sense of “loyalty” (including by
changing employee retention and evaluations practices), for increasing
institutional parity (including by giving veto-gate powers349 to institutions that are
usually weak), for enhancing the sense of professionalism in politics, and for
highlighting the relevant “tipping point.”350
But institutional designers might consider other strategies as well, perhaps
more creative ones that can also strengthen the norm of political stare decisis.
First, there have been recent suggestions in academic literature to increase the
involvement of historians in domestic policy processes, partly given how such
344

See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
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Cf. THE NEED FOR HUMILITY IN POLITICS: LESSONS FROM REGULATORY POLICY (Stefanie Haeffele
& Anne Hobson eds., 2019). Of course, the claim that respect to the past and traditions is desirable
in political decision-making generally, among other things because it represents the epistemic “bank
and capital of nations, and of ages,” is deeply associated today with Edmund Burke. See EDMUND
BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 183 (W. Alison Phillips & Catherine
Beatrice Phillips eds., 1912) (1790).
See supra note 16–17 and accompanying text.
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See supra Section IV.D.3.
Note that thinking about this issue in this a systemic way seems free of the challenges that apply, as
discussed before in Section VII.A.2, to precedenting at the level of specific precedents.
See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 756
(2015).
This too may involve changes in hiring practices in organizations, to ensure a specific balance of
thresholds. See generally Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOCIO. 1420
(1978).
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involvement will increase the weight of the past in political decision-making.351
There is no reason why such proposals could not be implemented broadly, in
many domestic systems as well as at the international level.352
Second, institutional designers may also consider examining the way the past
is memorialized and retrieved in political institutions, including what is and is not
memorialized and who controls the process of memorialization itself.353 Indeed,
there is much to the claim that today there is too little attention to issues of official
memorialization in domestic and international politics.
Finally, institutional designers might also consider creating avenues that will
increase the public’s ability to monitor officials’ willingness to respect the past. A
possible path to doing so is to institutionalize the use of the “public registries” of
past political precedents that have recently been established by various
nongovernmental outlets.354

VIII. R E VISITING J U DIC IAL S TARE D E C ISIS
A. Judicial Precedents as Political Precedents
I conclude the Article with a jurisprudential turn, and a twist: up to this point
I argued that political stare decisis cannot be fully equated with how we
conventionally understand judicial stare decisis. As I explained in Sections IV–VI
and summarized in Tables 1–3 above, several legal craft norms that apply to
judicial stare decisis make the comparison seem partial, if not misleading, including
that judicial precedents are established in “one go,” that the sincere beliefs of
judges are (largely) irrelevant to determine whether a past decision is precedential,
that there is no final overruling of a precedent before an authoritative overruling
is in fact received, that even transient majorities can overrule precedents, and that
judges can overrule prior precedents using only “reason, not power.”
In a world where judges and lawyers take these legal craft norms
“seriously,”355 the divergence between political and judicial stare decisis would
indeed be a powerful one. But is this really our world? Was it ever?
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See generally ALIX R. GREEN, HISTORY, POLICY, AND PUBLIC PURPOSE: HISTORIANS AND HISTORICAL
THINKING IN GOVERNMENT (2016). See also CATHERINE HADDON ET AL., WHAT IS THE VALUE OF
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See generally Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 319,
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For an example of a public registry, see Katerina Wright, Norms Watch: Tracking Team Trump’s Breaches
of Democratic Traditions, JUST SEC. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/LSM6-A2HS.
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At least since the advent of legal realism, we have serious reasons to doubt
it. As is well known, one of the realists’ most important legacies is that the
standards or rules that judges and lawyers apply to legal precedents are so flexible
that judges can use them to reach whatever results they want (at least when they
have enough time to navigate the complex system of legal rules).356 To the extent
that the realist claim is true, the entire basis for distinguishing between judicial
precedents and political precedents seems to disappear. Many of the legal craft
norms that supposedly create the divergence between judicial and political
precedents are revealed to be more nominal than real.
Indeed, if judges can reach any result they want relying on traditional legal
materials and legal craft norms, then it is highly doubtful that legal precedents
genuinely constrain the law in “one go.” This might make sense when the stakes
of the relevant precedent are low. But when the stakes are high, not so much.
Instead, judicial spectators will have sufficient reason to take a precedent as
constraining only when there is an indication that it has been internalized in a
more meaningful sense than what conventional legal craft norms (or legal
materials) suggest. Moreover, the path to learn about that internalization is
precisely the same one as we have seen political decision makers use to learn about
the internalization of events in politics that might be taken as precedential: first,
by inquiring into the actual beliefs and motivations of judges and what truly
explains their views in the precedential decision, including beyond formal legal
materials and craft norms of the legal profession. And second, by asking the Carl
von Clausewitz/Matrix question, “What comes next?” Or, to use Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s memorable phrase, by engaging in “prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact.”357 More specifically, court spectators will ask themselves
whether judges who are likely to disagree with the previous precedent will be able
to effectively undermine it in the future via any of the available methods of law
that permit doing so,358 such as distinguishing the case, overruling it, or narrowing
it down.359 And they will moreover adopt a dynamic perspective—looking not only
at the present pool of cases, but to possible future pools as well.
Obviously, this means that lawyers and judges will constantly breach the legal
craft norms that structure judicial stare decisis and that supposedly restrict (1)
inquiring into actual beliefs and motives of the voting judges and (2) asking “What
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The literature on this topic is legion. For a useful survey, see generally Schauer, supra note 41.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897).
“Effective” here can be either in the sense of (1) having the votes to undermine the previous
precedent or (2) issuing influential dissents or concurrences that have similar effect. See Thomas B.
Bennett, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin & Susan Navarro Smelcer, Divide & Concur: Separate
Opinions & Legal Change, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 846 (2018).
See also Jan G. Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553, 1584 (1974).
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comes next?”—even if on the discursive360 or argumentative361 level they will keep
insisting that they do observe the legal craft norms. And this also means that at
least in those high-stakes cases that stimulate disputes on and off the bench,
judicial precedents, like political precedents, also face a significant informational
burden before they become fully constraining. And that burden, as in politics, will
also likely be satisfied only in retrospect or cumulatively, i.e., when it will be clear that
the precedents indicate the existence or emergence of a political norm that
judges—like any other political official—will not want to upset.
Once we recognize that, on this post-realist understanding of judicial
precedents, what primarily matters for the generation of precedential constraint is
the level of internalization of a judicial precedent and whether it reflects an
emerging or existing first-order political norm, then all the other legal craft norms
that served to distinguish between legal and judicial precedents similarly start
appearing more nominal than real. For example, the legal craft norm that requires
formal overruling (or “testing”) before a precedent expires is at best a fragile one,
because judicial precedents that are not reaffirmed, have been abandoned, or have
been forgotten strongly indicate a weak level of internalization. They may,
therefore, lose their constraining force even absent formal overruling. And when
they will later be “tested,” the overruling would be a fait accompli. Furthermore,
even if a transient majority of a judicial panel can in principle do away with
precedents, that legal craft norm is similarly fragile. So long as that precedent
remains attached to a robust political norm, it is likely that judges will refrain from
interrupting it.
What all this means, then, is that at least on a post-realist view of law, judicial
precedents are exactly like political precedents. What distinguishes the two is not
the way in which they become constraining—they both constrain as a result of
the force of first-order political norms. Rather, it is that in law, the net of legal
craft norms creates a much more significant argumentative or discursive burdens
that will not similarly exist in politics.
To be sure, this post-realist understanding of judicial stare decisis is not
entirely new. Sophisticated judicial observers have absorbed this understanding of
judicial precedents. Rather than look exclusively and even primarily to legal craft
and the formal materials of legal reasoning, they, like decision makers in politics,
constantly ask the types of prophetic questions really required to more reliably
anticipate where to expect precedential constraint in law. In fact, precisely because
these issues are so significant, legal rhetoric has adapted as well. For instance, many
jurisdictions now recognize that not all judicial precedents are the same. Some
precedents become significantly entrenched and are hence “superprecedents” 362
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Levinson, supra note 234, at 709.
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and even “super-duper precedents”363 whereas others may become “weak”364 or
“bad”365 precedents if not reaffirmed.366 In certain contexts, even legal doctrine itself
has incorporated some of the prophetic and psychological considerations—for
instance, when doctrine acknowledged that overruling of precedents becomes
more easily justified when it represents a “doctrinal anachronism” or a “remnant
of abandoned doctrine”367 or in the context of the doctrine of “one last chance.”368
Given this, some might not find it very surprising that judicial precedents
are nothing but a particular kind of political precedent. Others might think it
obvious. I want to suggest, though, that even those who accept the post-realist
view of judicial precedents will have significantly gained from the previous
discussion in this Article. First, following this discussion, we can now see that the
mechanism that explains both superprecedents and weak (or bad) precedents is
primarily the connection between precedents and the existence of, respectively,
robust or fragile political norms.369
Second, we can now also see that on a post-realist perspective,
superprecedents may be the only type of precedents that we can talk about as being
truly constraining. Everything else is, in principle, up for grabs, “a ticket good for
one day and train only,”370 or a mere tool of persuasion, not constraint.371 And
superprecedents are themselves up for grabs, like “sticky” or hegemonic political
precedents,372 either temporarily (if “compensating adjustments” could not be
devised) or once the political norms with which they are associated begin eroding.
Finally, accepting that judicial precedents are but one species of political
precedents illuminates a path for those interested in advancing their causes
through the courts, to ensure that their precedential wins are indeed successful.
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Richard M. Re, Second Thoughts on “One Last Chance”?, 66 UCLA L. REV. 634 (2019).
To be sure, we may have good reasons to ask what precisely the political norm is that makes the precedent
a “superprecedent.” But that does not take away from the usefulness, as a causal and analytic matter, of
the conclusion that it is the force of political norms that makes superprecedents what they are. In my
view, this constitutes a suitable response to the criticism that is leveled against the term “superprecedents”
itself. See Jack Balkin, Don’t Talk to Me About Superprecedents, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 30, 2005),
https://perma.cc/CAB9-AFKW.
Richard M. Re, On “A Ticket Good for One Day Only,” 16 GREEN BAG 2D 155 (2013).
See supra Section II.A.

372

See supra Section V.B.

363

364
365

366

367
368
369

370

576

Vol. 22 No. 2

Political Stare Decisis

Tamir

That path, we can now see, is exactly the same as the one open to political actors.
This is what I have called in Section VII the task of precedenting. And it includes
all the elements described in Tables 4–5 above, such as the prescription that
establishing precedents is a continuous, steady work (rather than a “one-off”
enterprise) and that it might be wise to engage in excessively valorizing desirable
judicial precedents to make sure that they stick (or, conversely, “trash-talking”
undesirable precedents to increase their effective anti-canonicity).

B. Precedenting for Judicial Stare Decisis
My claim in Subsection A requires some qualification, however. For one, we
have seen in several places in this Article that judicial institutions differ from
political ones, given for instance their general passivity and slower “jurisprudential
cycles”373 or their slower rates of personnel turnover.374 These all may have
important effects on the ability of judicial precedents to constrain even on a fully
post-realist understanding of law.
Additionally, the discussion so far ignored that even in politics, constraint by
precedent can be achieved not only via political norms of the first order, but also
due to a second-order norm of political stare decisis. As we have seen, law
certainly has a similar norm—the norm of judicial stare decisis.375 Moreover, the
force of the norm of judicial stare decisis might be generally stronger than that of
its political parallel, for reasons discussed throughout, including law’s robust
rhetorical burdens and the stronger sense of professionalism of those who “make
up the lawyer class.”376
In recent years, however, many believe that despite its potential to serve as
an effective constraint, the norm of judicial stare decisis has significantly weakened
in various apex courts around the world. For instance, in relation to the U.S.
Supreme Court, some have concluded that the norm of stare decisis has become
entirely “impotent.”377 In Israel, similar general weakening of stare decisis at the
Supreme Court has also been reported with some commentators wondering if
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some of the Justices are genuinely and consistently willing to adhere to it. 378 In
Canada, worries about the resilience of stare decisis have also been raised after the
Supreme Court, in a recent 2018 case concerning the law on religious
accommodation, did not feel bound to apply its stare decisis framework and
virtually ignored it.379 And in India, commentators recently suggested that the
“larger bench rule,” according to which a previous Supreme Court precedent can
only be overruled by a bench larger than the one that delivered the precedential
decision, has also been importantly weakened.380
Those who are displeased by this situation have been sometimes drawn to
offer solutions that rely on traditional legal craft tools—for instance, by suggesting
which reasons are impermissible for overruling past precedents,381 by trying to
give greater structure to the way judges determine what the “holding” is of a
particular case and what should be considered “dicta,”382 or by insisting on a
“theory” for judicial stare decisis.383 Yet, for someone prone to accept the
post-realist understanding of law, these solutions seem largely beside the point.
The realist insight—which highlights the inevitable indeterminacy of legal
materials and craft norms—applies with similar force to all these solutions as
well.384
This does not mean that other solutions, more aligned with the so-called
“realist program,” cannot be devised. One such solution obviously lies in the design
of judicial institutions—for example, by changing the way judges are selected or
their terms in office.385 But another, more novel solution worth flagging here is
about behavior: Earlier we saw there might be some room for actors to influence
the content and resilience of the precedents that occur in politics if those actors
engage in what I called precedenting.386 I also suggested that this is how actors
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primarily focused on judicial precedents should view their own enterprise. 387 But
at this point, it is worth nothing that the craft of precedenting may be valuable not
only at the first-order level but at the second-order level as well, as a tool to strengthen
the norm of judicial stare decisis itself.
The basic idea is to deliberately create what we can think of as “precedents
within precedents” or “double-layer precedents.” On one level, these precedents
will simply reaffirm the previous first-order judicial precedent. On another level,
though, the aim would also be for that reaffirmation to take a particular form, one
that strongly signals that the primary reason for the reaffirmation is judges’ belief
in the norm of political stare decisis rather than their substantive agreement with
the precedent (as we saw before,388 a key component of precedenting is avoiding
the appearance of opportunism).
It is easy to imagine how the judges in various apex courts around the world
could in principle coordinate amongst themselves to engage in this form of
deliberate precedenting for the sake of strengthening the norm of judicial stare
decisis. Most clearly, this would entail assigning the writing of a decision
confirming, and even extending, a previous precedent to a judge or justice that
vehemently disagreed with it in the past. It would also entail choosing cases that
provide for such opportunities in the first place.389 Recall as well that the aim here
is not and should not be maximal adherence to the norm of judicial stare decisis
such that judges would be required to completely suffocate substantive
disagreements. Rather, the requirement should only be to reaffirm the norm of
judicial stare decisis enough, so that non-adherence to the norm would not lead to
crossing the “tipping point,”390 beyond which that norm of stare decisis will simply
cease to be credible.
An entirely different matter, however, is whether the possibility of engaging
in this practice of “precedents within precedents” will be realized in the political
climate that exists today in many countries around the world. Indeed, the same
reasons that have arguably made the norm of judicial stare decisis weaken in the
first place in at least some of those systems—including the increased politicization
of the courts391 and the high degree of political polarization in various societies
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more broadly392—raise doubts as to whether the coordination needed to achieve
this among judges could realistically be expected. Ultimately, it might very well be
that, at least without more significant changes in constitutional politics and
culture, the likelihood of a resilient norm of judicial stare decisis in those systems
where it has weakened, is systematically slim.

IX. C ONC LU SION
I began this Article by asking whether political stare decisis is at all possible.
By the end, I hope to have shown that it is possible but that its operation is quite
complex. Among other things, it depends on the political stakes of the issue and
on the resilience of political norms, of either the first or the second order. And it
can either be very fragile or very strong. The task of trying to “tinker” with political
stare decisis—what I have called precedenting—is similarly possible but
complicated.
I also hope to have demonstrated in this Article that, as far as achieving past
constraint is concerned, political stare decisis might in fact be all there is. Indeed,
at least if one embraces a post-realist understanding of law and legal institutions,
even judicial stare decisis is revealed to be nothing more than one species of
political stare decisis. The functional, explanatory, and prescriptive lessons from
the Article are therefore not only relevant in the domain of politics. They are also
relevant to law. More specifically, the Article suggests that those who seek to affect
the content of judicial precedents, or strengthen judicial stare decisis itself, across
the vast array of judiciaries that follow this practice (explicitly or implicitly), should
at least in part embrace the same lens as those who wish to affect the content of
domestic and international political precedents, or strengthen political stare
decisis, ought to embrace as well.
As in other contexts, here too we get a fuller sense of the law by beginning
with politics first.
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